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The pro gradu -thesis discusses the liability issues regarding Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
applications, especially liability of robots and other autonomous machines, and it 
provides an answer to the question “Who is liable when AI makes a mistake?” This 
problem is looked first from the national and more individual perspective and then from 
an international perspective regarding the state’s responsibility and jurisdiction.  
The main issue can is that if, for example, a self-driving car collides with another vehicle, 
who then can be held liable as instead of a human, the car was driven by an algorithm. As 
there is no human driver, the responsible party needs to be found somewhere else, and it 
could be the owner or the manufacturer of the car, the software designer or at some point 
maybe even the AI itself. Also, no one can be blamed without reasons or applicable law, 
so there is a need for suitable reasoning to hold the party liable, and the legislations need 
to be updated to recognise the liable party regarding the new technology. These same 
aspects are also examined by the point of view of international law and treaties, especially 
regarding state jurisdiction and responsibility. 
The research method of this study is a qualitative and a bit legal dogmatic method. My 
primary sources are different articles and reports on AI liability and various international 
books from important international law authors as well as publications from international 
organisations. Also, different national and international guidelines and legislation have 
an integral part in regulating AI, and therefore they are also utilised and analysed. 
The findings of this research are that there is not just one and simple answer to the 
questions about the liable party, and the liable person depends greatly on the situation. 
The manufacturer could often be held strictly liable for any damage caused by the AI 
product. In addition, the owner of the product could be held liable in the same way as the 
owner of the animal and in the future robots could get personhood similar to the 
personhood of the companies, which would make the robot liable for itself. However, the 
legislation in this area is a bit behind from the technological development internationally 
and nationally. That means that the law needs to catch up with the technical development 
so victims can get compensated by the right liable party. 
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Tutkielma käsittelee tekoälyä koskevia vastuukysymyksiä, liittyen erityisesti robotteihin 
ja muihin autonomisiin koneisiin. Tutkielma myös pyrkii vastaamaan kysymykseen 
”Kuka on vastuussa, kun tekoäly tekee virheen?” Tätä kysymystä ja koko 
vastuuongelmaa tarkastellaan kansallisesta ja yksilöllisestä näkökulmasta sekä 
kansainvälisestä näkökulmasta. 
Pääkysymys on, että jos esimerkiksi itse ajava auto törmää toiseen ajoneuvoon, kuka on 
vastuussa, koska ihmisen sijaan algoritmi ajoi autoa. Koska kuljettajaa ei ole, joku muu 
on vastuussa oleva henkilö, joka voi olla auton omistaja tai valmistaja, 
ohjelmistosuunnittelija tai jopa tekoäly itse. Ketään myöskään ei voida syyttää ilman 
aihetta tai sovellettavaa lakia, joten vastuunalaisen henkilön löytämiseksi on oltava 
asianmukaiset perustelut. Myös lakien täytyy olla ajan tasalla koskien uutta teknologiaa 
ja siihen liittyviä vastuukysymyksiä. Näitä samoja asioita tarkastellaan myös 
kansainvälisen oikeuden ja sopimusten näkökulmasta, erityisesti valtioiden 
lainkäyttövallan ja vastuun osalta. 
Tutkielman metodi on laadullinen sekä osittain myös oikeusdogmaattinen. Ensisijaisina 
lähteinä ovat erilaiset artikkelit ja raportit tekoälyn vastuusta, kansainvälisen oikeuden 
kirjoitukset tärkeiltä kansainvälisen oikeuden kirjoittajilta sekä kansainvälisten 
järjestöjen julkaisut. Eri kansallisilla ja kansainvälisillä ohjeistuksilla ja lainsäädännöllä 
on myös olennainen osa tekoälyn sääntelyssä, ja siksi tutkielma tutkii myös niitä. 
Tutkielman johtopäätöksenä on, että vastuunalaista henkilöä koskeviin kysymyksiin ei 
ole vain yhtä vastausta, ja tilanteesta riippuu, kuka on vastuussa. Valmistaja on usein 
ankarasti vastuussa robotin aiheuttamista vahingoista. Lisäksi tuotteen omistaja voi olla 
mahdollista saattaa vastuuseen kuten eläimen omistaja ja tulevaisuudessa robotit voisivat 
saada oikeushenkilön kaltaisen henkilöllisyyden, jolloin robotti voisi olla itse vastuussa. 
Lainsäädäntö on kuitenkin jäljessä tekniikan kehityksestä niin kansainvälisesti kuin 
kansallisesti tekoälyn suhteen. Lain tulisi pysyä tekniikan kehityksen mukana, jotta 
vastuussa oleva henkilö voidaan löytää ja vahingonkärsijä saa korvauksensa. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 Background 
1.1.1 Study context 
The name "Artificial Intelligence" (AI) could probably bring things like "Terminator" and 
"Skynet" from the movie series Terminator, "Hal" from the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey, or 
even "KITT" from the series "Knight Rider" to people's mind. Things that are just science 
fiction and nothing to do with real-life or things that exist only in our imagination and in 
television/videogames. However, as one can see when just looking around, AI is not just science 
fiction anymore. From industrial robots to videogames and electric kettles, AI is almost 
everywhere and in everything, so even though the household robots are not terminators and Siri 
is not KITT, we use AI nearly every day. And as it has been with all the new inventions (cars, 
computers, bitcoins), there needs to be legislation for those, and lawmakers need to implement 
new laws and regulations to regulate the innovations. One crucial aspect to consider is the tort 
law aspect, in other words, who is liable to compensate for the damage and for what reason. 
That is also the case with AI as there could be multiple responsible parties, and it is even more 
important with the self-learning applications like a self-driving car. ‘ 
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to addressing liability and regulatory issues associated 
with the new growing technology. The solution is to have the correct balance between 
encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship and also on addressing real safety and privacy 
concerns.1 As new technologies, among other things self-driving cars, drones, augmented and 
virtual reality as well as the internet of things (IoT)2, get more and more popular, rules and laws 
governing the new technology need to keep up.  As the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform 
stated in their report: 
"[a]s products become more capable of learning, making decisions on their own, and developing 
their own "personalities," will existing legal principles prove sufficient to determine liability for 
                                                 
1 Silverman – Wilson – Goggans 2018, p. 6. 
2 OECD 2016, p. 80. “IoT comprises devices and objects whose state can be altered via Internet, with or without 
the active involvement of individuals. The term goes beyond devices traditionally connected to the Internet, like 
laptops and smartphones, by including all kinds of objects and sensors that permeate the public space, the 
workplaces and home --.” 
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injuries or resolve disputes? When such cases arise, plaintiffs' lawyers will look at everyone 
involved, including the inventor of the AI product, its manufacturer, and its owner."3 
Why is it so important to give some thought for the liability of AI-systems? There are many 
answers to that, but one crucial part, which concerns everyone, is to know the party from whom 
one can claim compensation for the damages. Be it privately owned robot destroying property 
or authorities’ AI-system giving the wrong answer or decision which causes harm. Now and 
especially in the future, the liable party in AI-related accidents is not so clear anymore, which 
means that the answer to the question "who is liable, if X makes a mistake" is not so clear 
anymore. The question about liability is also considered by the Chancellor of Justice of Finland, 
who is trying to find the answer to this question, which he says is one of the critical legal ethical 
issues now in Finland as well as internationally.4 Furthermore, according to the European 
Parliament's "Report on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the 
Internet of Things and robotics", it is essential that victims of AI-accidents have the same level 
of protection compared to similar other products and services. Otherwise, the societal 
acceptance of these new technologies could be reduced.5 
Woodrow Barfield, professor emeritus from the University of Washington, states in his article 
that by using machine learning6 techniques, robots can learn tasks that are beyond the 
capabilities of, among other things, industrial robots that operate with a static set of instructions. 
In addition to these robots, many machine learning approaches use algorithms that let the 
software learn by itself, to perform tasks like speech and image recognition. As, for example, 
the algorithms control a robot by directing its actions, algorithms could be a contributing factor 
to injuries or property damage.7  
What comes to AI liability, the courts should, according to Barfield, focus on their decisions, 
which involve determining liability, more on the machine learning software and algorithms 
                                                 
3 Silverman – Wilson – Goggans 2018, p. 12. 
4 Helsingin Sanomat / Oikeuskansleri Pöysti kiirehtii pelisääntöjä tekoälyn käyttöön: ”Kenen on vastuu, jos kone 
tekee virheen?”. The Finnish Counsellor of Justice wondered for example that if machine makes mistake in medical 
examination, who has the liability: doctor, software maker or the instructor of the machine. 
5 European Commission 2020, p. 13. More of this report will be discussed on the sub-subsection 3.2.2. 
6 Systems or machines that learn by their own and improve their performance in a given task from examples and 
previous examples. See more in sub-subsection 1.1.2. 
7 Barfield 2018, p. 194. 
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controlling a robot. When robots learn to solve problems with solutions entirely unknown for a 
human operator and at the same time increase their independence in decision making and 
mobility, they gain skills and abilities that could lead to entirely unpredictable actions. So if 
this would be the situation, who has the liability if or when damages to property or people take 
place, especially if any human was not aware of the robot's activities or did not know of the 
workings of the algorithms controlling the robot's behaviour?8 
Globally the liability issue with AI might not be so huge at this moment, but AI is already 
almost everywhere9 , and for example, more and more cars are using or soon using AI to drive 
itself. Also, according to Tractica, the worldwide revenue of AI software will grow from $1,4 
billion in 2016 to almost $60 billion by 2025.10 These numbers show that besides AI being a 
significant and profitable market, in a few years the amount of AI products will grow 
significantly and when there are more AI products, the probability of problems and liability 
issues will also grow up. The consultant firm PwC has also reported that AI will have an 
immense impact on the following industries: healthcare; automotive; financial services; retail 
and consumer; technology, communications and, entertainment; manufacturing; energy; and 
transport and logistics.11 All of these are that kind of industries where one would not want any 
accidents and errors to happen (with the AI), even though it is inevitable. So when the accident 
does occur, in addition, to get the answer to the question "why this happened?", people also 
want the answer to the question "who is liable for this?". 
Finally, why the issue about the liable party is essential here, is because often AI products are 
integrated into intricate IoT-environments where many different connected devices and services 
are interacting together. What this means is that the liable person may be hard to identify when 
there are many digital components combined in one intricate ecosystem, and many actors can 
be involved. Hence because of this complexity, victims may find it quite challenging to identify 
                                                 
8 Barfield 2018, p. 194. 
9 For example we have AI helpers in our smartphones, we use streaming services, which utilize AI in giving 
recommendations to us, we use robots to vacuum our houses and cut the crass and factories use robots to make 
cars and other commodities. 
10 See: https://tractica.omdia.com/newsroom/press-releases/artificial-intelligence-software-revenue-to-reach-59-
8-billion-worldwide-by-2025/. 
11 See: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/data-and-analytics/publications/artificial-intelligence-
study.html#explorer. 
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the liable person and prove all necessary conditions for a successful claim, as required under 
national law. Besides, products and services, which rely on AI, will also interact with traditional 
technologies and that leads to more complexity in terms of liability, as is the case with cars, as 
autonomous vehicles will share the road with regular cars for some time. There will be similar 
complexity in some service sectors like healthcare, where automated AI systems will support 
humans in making decisions.12 
1.1.2 Defining Artificial Intelligence 
Even though in this thesis I'm mainly focusing on autonomous products and robots, it is good 
to know what AI is, how it is defined and what kind of forms of AI there are. We watch series 
from "Netflix", listen to music from "Spotify" and clean our houses with "Roomba". These are 
all modern things using or being some form of AI. Things like Netflix and Spotify use 
algorithms to get to know their user for giving better entertainment experience by suggesting 
series13 and music14, which best corresponds to the user's likings. But what AI really is? In fact, 
“Artificial Intelligence” is an umbrella term for different kinds of products, even though people 
generally use that term to define and mean all the things which are intelligent machines. So, all 
in all, it is quite hard to give a definite answer about what is AI, and that would require its own 
thesis. 
Artificial Intelligence means many different things, and it has been defined in numerous ways. 
One definition was given by John McCarthy, who was one of the pioneers of AI. His definition 
                                                 
12 European Commission 2020, p. 14. 
13 According to Netflix website https://help.netflix.com/en/node/100639 their service tries to estimate the 
likelihood the person will watch particular title. They use factors such as viewing history, ratings, other members 
with similar tastes and preferences and information about the titles. This is to help subscribers to find a show or 
movie to enjoy with minimal effort.  
14 Marr 2019, pp. 173-175: Spotify uses machine learning powered technology, which is used in highly popular 
“Discover Weekly” playlists. They are made AI made playlist, where AI makes new playlist every week about 
new music which it thinks the user likes, based on the user listening habits. This is done by process called 
collaborative filtering. This is done for example that person A listens lots of artists X and Y. Another person B 
listens lots of artists W and Y. By this data the algorithm deduces that person A then may then enjoy artist W and 
B may enjoy listening artist X. Of course in reality this is much more complicated system, because Spotify has 
tens of millions of users who listen many different artists and that why AI is made for this job. The recommendation 
system uses also audio analysis and natural language processing when determining most suitable songs for the 
user. This includes inter alia breaking down every song in smaller parts like instruments used, tempo and beat to 
determine even better the user’s music taste to people who listens to music with same kind of tempo, instruments 
and beat. 
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for the AI was "The goal of AI is to develop machines that behave as though they were 
intelligent".15 Other definitions given for an AI are, inter alia, Elaine Rich's description for AI 
according to which it is the study of how to make computers do things at which, at the moment, 
people are better. Encyclopaedia Britannica’s definition is as follows: "AI is the ability of digital 
computers or computer controlled robots to solve problems that are normally associated with 
the higher intellectual processing capabilities of humans …"16. Also, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has defined AI and according to them, "AI 
is defined as the ability of machines and systems to acquire and apply knowledge and to carry 
out intelligent behaviour. This means performing a broad variety of cognitive tasks, e.g. 
sensing, processing oral language, reasoning, learning, making decisions and demonstrating 
an ability to move and manipulate objects accordingly. Intelligent systems use a combination 
of big data analytics, cloud computing, machine-to-machine communication and the [IoT] to 
operate and learn".17 
Although they all define AI in some way, they have some flaws in them, which does not make 
them suitable definitions for AI on their own.18 After these definitions, it is easy to see that AI 
cannot be easily explained or defined, and it is not easy to answer the question "what is Artificial 
Intelligence?". Therefore, as AI is more like an umbrella term and it consists of several sub-
fields, even though in everyday language it is as "default" word for all AI products, I listed a 
few different categories/subfields of AI and their definitions: 
Deep learning = In deep learning, lots of data is analysed, and the algorithm will perform the 
task repeatedly, each time twisting and editing the job a little to improve the outcome. That 
means that the increased computing power of modern computers has allowed researchers to 
increase the complexity of a mathematical model to reach levels that are quantitatively and 
qualitatively different from before.19 
                                                 
15 Ertel 2017, p. 1. 
16 Ertel 2017, p. 2. 
17 OECD 2016, p. 86. 
18 Ertel 2017. See author’s arguments for the weaknesses of the definitions in question on pages 1-3. For example 
by the definition in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, AI would be anything which can memorize long texts or make 
complicated calculations, so any given computer. 
19 Intellipaat/ What is Artificial Intelligence? and Elements of AI. 
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Machine learning = Systems or machines that learn on their own and improve their 
performance in a given task from examples. Machine learning can be divided into its own three 
subcategories. First is supervised learning in which input is given, and the mission is to predict 
the correct output or label. For example, there is a picture of a traffic sign, and the machine 
needs to predict which traffic sign it is. Second is unsupervised learning, where the task is to 
discover the structure of the data. The third category is reinforcement learning, which is usually 
used in situations where, for example, a self-driving car must operate in an environment and 
where feedback about good or bad choices is not available immediately.20 
Robotics = Robotics is basically building and programming robots so that they can operate in 
complex, real-world scenarios. Robotics is kind of the ultimate challenge of AI because it 
requires a combination of many areas of AI. These areas are, for example, computer vision (it 
allows computers to see, recognise, and process images, like human vision does, and then it 
provides an appropriate output) and natural language processing (develops approaches that help 
us communicate with machines using natural human languages).21 
That was just a shortlist of different AI definitions and subfields for an example. In addition to 
those, there are many other definitions and subfields for AI.  Lastly, I will briefly explain a few 
AI applications to give some background where AI has been used. In addition to explaining 
different forms, I will also mention which of those subfields mentioned above effects on the 
application in question and in the end I provide some potential situations in which the 
application could raise liability issues. 
The self-driving car is probably one of the most known AI application, and self-driving cars are 
quite often referred to in media22 as different technology companies try to make their own self-
driving cars, although self-driving cars have sometimes had slightly negative news around 
them.23 However, how those cars work is probably not as known thing as the self-driving car 
                                                 
20 Intellipaat/ What is Artificial Intelligence? and Elements of AI. 
21 Intellipaat/ What is Artificial Intelligence? and Elements of AI.  
22 For example about Tesla see https://fortune.com/2019/11/20/tesla-full-self-driving-car-tsla-stock/ and for 
Alphabet https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/23/alphabet-exec-admits-google-overhyped-self-driving-cars.html. 
23 The Verge / The world’s first robot car death was the result of human error — and it can happen again: Uber’s 
car crashed and killed 49-year-old woman in world’s first death by self-driving car, although it seems to have been 
result of human error.  
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itself. Basically, AI is used to make decisions based on the road conditions around the vehicle, 
like the direction where the vehicle is going, the planned destination and the behaviour of the 
other traffic nearby. Data from the camera is then processed using computer vision to allow the 
car to understand what it is "seeing" and to react accordingly. This all functions on three 
different levels; internal, global and local.24  
In the internal level, the information is gathered and processed internally by the car. In the 
global level, information is collected and shared between several vehicles. In the local level 
information is collected by temporary networks of self-driving vehicles which are close to each 
other. Also, the level of the autonomous is divided into five different levels which portray how 
autonomous the vehicle is, and here level five means full autonomous. For example, in 2019 
the autonomous level Tesla had was level 2, meaning it had autopilot and it could change lanes, 
park itself and match speeds to traffic conditions, but the driver had to be ready all the time to 
take charge in any moment.25 
Medical institutions also use AI to help doctors in treating patients. For example, a Chinese 
company called "Infervision" has developed technology similar to Google's and Facebook 
technology that can detect cancers using computer vision, which understands and interprets 
visual data. So with deep learning, it interprets data from X-rays and other medical data and 
recognises shapes in the body, which could be cancers. The closest popular product acting this 
way is Google's image search work.26 Uses for AI do not, however, end here, because AI can 
be used and is currently used in many companies to do different things. Unilever uses AI, more 
precisely machine learning, computer vision and, natural language processing, for recruiting. 
By this, they can reduce the amount from 250.000 applicants to less than 4.000 applicants by 
just AI-powered hiring, and in this way, they save about 70.000 hours of working time.27 
The food and beverage companies utilise AI nowadays as well in their business operations. 
McDonald's automates its processes by self-service kiosks, which automatically can promote 
                                                 
24 Marr 2019, pp. 312. 
25 Marr 2019, pp. 312-313. 
26 Marr 2019, pp. 239-240. 
27 Marr 2019, pp. 130-132. 
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different products depending, for example, on the local ordering trends28 and Domino's uses 
machine learning and computer vision in their system called "Pizza Checker". The AI-system 
photographs pizzas to analyse their quality by checking that it is really the pizza the customer 
ordered and that the crust is baked correctly. Then, it sends that photo to the customer to tell 
the pizza is ready or that it had to be remade because of quality issues. Eventually, this should 
lead to fewer pizzas to be rejected by the customers because their quality expectations are not 
met.29 
Here we can see that AI used in many different things from ordering food to saving people from 
cancers. Uses for AI are limitless, and probably no one knows what applications will be coming 
in the future. But just like with almost any product, also products containing AI can be used for 
malicious purposes or they just malfunction and someone or something gets hurt. For example, 
in such a harmless thing like Domino's "Pizza Checker" the AI could make a mistake, and the 
customer gets the wrong pizza after all. Then he could demand a new pizza or refund, which 
has additional costs for the company, primarily if the pizza has already delivered.  The situation 
is even worse if Infervision's cancer spotting system makes an error, and it does not detect 
cancer. If the diagnose is done based only on this, and then the patient dies for cancer, someone 
needs to take responsibility. Here stakes are higher, but the result is mainly the same as with 
Pizza Checker. Something went wrong, results were not what they supposed to be, and someone 
needs to take responsibility. 
 Methods and research 
Alvesalo and Ervasti have divided the purpose of the research in four different categories: 
exploratory, explanatory, descriptive and predictive.30 The research in my thesis is mainly the 
first two, exploratory and explanatory. The explanatory research is pictured that it answers the 
questions "how, what kind of" as well as it sees what is happening, finds new viewpoints and 
explains phenomena. The exploratory research, on the other hand, answers the question "why" 
as well as looks an explanation to the situation or the problem and identifies probable causal 
connections. These research categories show in my thesis in many ways. Firstly, my thesis tries 
                                                 
28 Marr 2019, p. 106. 
29 Marr 2019, p. 96. 
30 Alvesalo – Ervasti 2006, p. 19. 
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to provide answers to the questions "How someone can be liable?" and "Why someone is 
liable?". My thesis also tries to find new viewpoints to the question about liability and tries to 
find an explanation to the problems with the AI liability. In other words, this thesis is looking 
for an explanation of the liability of AI products in national legislations as well as international 
legislation. 
The research in my thesis is more qualitative and legal dogmatic than quantitative research. As 
Alvesalo and Ervasti states, in qualitative research theory is often built by the basis of the usable 
materials. The materials are collected from the inspected phenomenon and by understanding 
that the researcher tries to build up a new theory. Although, also in qualitative research, the 
researcher goes through the bibliography and terms, which belong to that topic, and then he 
forms glasses, through which results are viewed.31 In this thesis, I have first studied the AI, 
liability and liability of AI by going through different materials and case studies. Although my 
theory is not new in a way that there would not have been written anything about this, it is still 
a relatively new subject. As I mentioned in the previous subsection, there are not any clear 
answer to this theme, and I want on my part provide one possible theory and responds to this 
problem. However, this thesis is not entirely qualitative research, as there are some signs of 
quantitative analysis, too, as I will present some current theories regarding this subject. The 
primary method is still qualitative research. 
As this thesis is from the field of international law there, of course, need be and there are 
international materials, aspects, doctrines and methods in this thesis. Firstly the materials. All 
the material in this thesis is international. I do not provide answers to anything by just one state 
legislation and bibliography. Still, I use a wide variation of legislations and bibliography, even 
though they are mainly from the western states, excluding international organisations. I have 
studied legislations, guidelines and literature from the European Union (EU), its member states 
and the United States of America (US). In addition, I have studied different reports, working 
papers and guidelines from international organisations like the United Nations (UN) and its sub 
organisations as well as from the OECD. Of course, the international law thesis would not be 
an international thesis, if there would not have any studies from the relevant international law 
authors. Therefore I have discussed the theories presented by Ian Brownlie as well as Timo 
Koivurova and the publication in The Oxford handbook of international environmental law. 
                                                 
31 Alvesalo – Ervasti 2006, p. 20. 
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What comes to the international law doctrines, the doctrines I have mainly used the sources 
doctrine, the state responsibility doctrine, the jurisdiction doctrine and the sovereignty doctrine. 
The source doctrine can be seen throughout the thesis, but the other doctrines are mainly in use 
in the main section 3, and they are also defined there. As I am looking at the liability of AI in 
the international context there, I utilise those doctrines and apply them in practice. I thought 
this would be the best practice, as then the reader remembers those doctrines better and also 
that I do not make this introduction section too long by also defining those principles. However, 
sources doctrine I am going go to go shortly through here because as Brownley said, the sources 
of international law and the law of treaties are regarded as essential as an objects of study 
because they provide the primary particles of the legal regime.32 For this reason, it is good to 
study it already a bit here as it also an essential part of the research. 
As a principle in international law, the general consent of states creates rules of general 
application. That is why there are not any "formal sources" in international law, and the 
definition of custom in international law is basically a statement of that principle. For this 
reason, it is essential in international law to have a variety of material sources, which shows the 
existence of the consensus of the states concerning particular rules or practices. These sources 
are the decisions of the International Court, resolutions of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations and "law-making" multilateral treaties. It is also good to mention that according to 
Brownley the "term" sources refer to two different things, which are the binding quality of 
international law as such and the literary sources of the law as sources of information.33  
Consequently, I have used these sources in my thesis too, directly or indirectly. For example, 
when I define and explain those other international law doctrines, there can be seen decisions 
of the International Court and multilateral treaties shaping those doctrines. Multilateral treaties 
also play a big part when I examine the liability, legislation and guidelines on AI in an 
international context as well as when I analyse the current situation in the international AI 
liability legal regime. Besides those material sources, I also have other international references 
in the meaning of the literary sources of the law as sources of information. I have state 
legislation and international and national judicial decisions, which are the material sources of 
                                                 
32 Brownlie 2003, p. 3. 
33 Brownlie 2003, pp. 3-4. 
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the customary law.34 And finally, as mentioned before, I have decisions and reports from the 
international (and national) organisations as my sources. 
Then to my research and research question. As the question about liability is essential, my thesis 
intends to give some clarity to this issue and provide an answer to the question about who can 
be held liable when AI causes injury. In addition, I try to give some clarification about what is 
the effective regulation now and what there are proposed for regulation about the AI liability 
globally and finally note the differences in the regulation. In other words, my research questions 
can be summarised to one main question and two subquestions. The main question is " Who 
can be held responsible by law for the damages caused by the actions of Artificial Intelligence?"  
The first subquestion is about the grounds for the liability of the party, so what are the legal 
grounds for holding the person liable for the actions of Artificial Intelligence? Furthermore, the 
second subquestion is about the effective legislation so is the current legislation enough to 
regulate Artificial Intelligence and can it keep up with the fast-evolving technology? These 
same questions are asked in national and then in an international context. Even though the 
setting is different and of course, the global context is broader, as it includes states responsibility 
and not just the individual person liability, the fundamental issue of the liable party stays the 
same. The main research question is well involved in almost every section and subsection in 
this thesis, and it well reflects the main issue handled in this thesis.  
 Structure and limitations 
In this thesis, I have already given background as well as defined the AI and its applications. In 
the following main section, I observe the liability issues regarding AI from an individual 
perspective. I start by defining general liability according to the tort law, and then I represent 
fault liability and strict liability. Then on the second sub-sub section, I provide answers to my 
research question about who could be the liable party. I look at the possible liable parties, the 
manufacturer and the owner, and provide different situations where they could be liable and on 
what basis. I also present the possibility of holding the robot itself liable and on the other hand 
what possible rights and responsibilities that brings to robots and humans. 
                                                 
34 Brownlie 2003, p. 6. 
12 
 
After examining the subject about the liable party, I continue the subject by looking at the AI 
guidance and legislation in the US and the EU and provide several examples of them. Even 
though I have already made observations to legislation in the US, the EU and its member states 
in the earlier section, I will give a short listing about different regulations and guidelines in 
them to get a closer look what is happening in legislative wise. Furthermore, I will examine 
quite shortly the risk management in AI liability. Here I first study about supervising the AI, 
which could at least try to prevent some potential accidents made by AI. I will also look closer 
to liability insurances. Insurances are already used for risk management in the way that if I 
cause damages, I do not need to pay the damages by myself, but the insurance company takes 
the financial risk. This same system could and should also be used with AI, so, for example, the 
owner would not need to bear all the risk by himself or herself.  
In the fourth main section, I will cover the international legal framework for liability and AI. I 
will start by defining more closely couple essential international law doctrines regarding 
liability: state responsibility and sovereignty as well as territorial sovereignty. Here I just go 
them through in theory and later on study them in practice. Earlier I have examined liability 
regimes and AI legislation more from a national view, so here I will have a more international 
look to those and review the international legislation and guidelines regarding liability and AI. 
After the theory, I will analyse how current international regulation and agreements could be 
amended to cover also AI and how national legislation could fulfil international legislation.  
Before the conclusions, I still observe one case involving situations where AI has caused harm 
in one way or another and then analysing them. In this chapter, I also consider the liable parties 
in a real-world view and as an example, define a couple of possible real-life situations where 
someone is liable. In the conclusions chapter, I summarise my thesis and provide answers to 
my research questions. I will also give so thought about what further research there could be or 
would be needed to do to get a better understanding of this whole issue. 
As the space in the thesis is quite limited, I cannot examine all the things I would like to, or 
there would be needed to study. So firstly regarding liability, I limit this thesis to be only about 
civil liability and not criminal liability, because it is quite easy to draw the line between these 
two, and it limits my subject remarkably. What comes to AI and its applications, I will be mainly 
observing the liability caused by robots/robotics software type robots, like chatbots. Stuff like 
3D printing, artificial reality, and virtual reality and possible liability issues produced by them 
are excluded from this thesis. Furthermore, as this is a juridical thesis and I am mainly looking 
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at these issues from the law point of view, I will not be considering the possible ethical and 
moral issues that certainly will be in this kind of subject, especially regarding giving robots a 
status of and ePerson.  
I chose the US for closer examination because according to the working paper by the Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific of the United Nations, tech giants such as 
Alibaba, Amazon, Baidu, Facebook, and Google account over 75% of total AI investments to 
date [date of the paper, so 2017]35 . From these five tech companies, three of them are from the 
US. In addition, according to the same working paper, in the years 2010-2014 the US led with 
the filed patents with AI-related patent applications and a few analysts have listed global 
companies in terms of investment in AI, and from these eight companies, seven are from the 
US.36 Hence it can be stated that the US is a big player in the field of AI, so the importance of 
the US is significant, and therefore it makes sense to study the legislation in there. 
As already explained, I am observing mainly legislations in the EU and the US, besides to 
international law. However, I will not be covering all the legislation and regulations governing 
AI in the US and the EU, but I instead give some examples of the regulations. Finally, the 
purpose of this thesis is not to give an absolute answer to who should be held liable in different 
situations. That is because the conditions vary every time, and there no one can give any definite 
answer, as is usually the thing with the law. The final liable party will be for courts to decide. 
What I hope this thesis would provide, is to give some material and examples for the thought 
process about what the legislation could be and how it could be applied to the AI. I also want 
on my part to help to figure out at least one answer to the question "Who is liable when the 
machine makes a mistake?" and of course I will provide my opinion now and then. 
   
                                                 
35 Akhtar – Wong – Wang – Ngernlim 2017, p. 3. 
36 Akhtar – Wong – Wang – Ngernlim 2017, p. 4. 
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2 NATIONAL LEGISLATIONS APPROACHES TO WHO IS LIABLE WHEN 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MAKES MISTAKE 
 Tort law liability regarding individual natural and legal persons 
2.1.1 General liability provisions 
To better understand liability issues with AI, it is a good thing to know a bit about liability and 
tort law in general. Like Barfield states "liability is about establishing who is to blame with 
system failures–or, more accurately, who society can extract legal redress from–when 
something goes wrong".37 As one reason, or as the main reason, for "liability" we can use as an 
example the definition made by the European Group on Tort Law38 in "Principles of European 
Tort Law" (PETL). Its article 1:101 gives an overview of the grounds for liability: 
"(1) A person to whom damage to another is legally attributable is liable to compensate that 
damage. 
(2) Damage may be attributed in particular to the person 
a) whose conduct constituting fault has caused it; or 
b) whose abnormally dangerous activity has caused it; or 
c) whose auxiliary has caused it within the scope of his actions."39  
That means that a person has to compensate another person's harm only when at least one of 
those requirements for liability are met. That is, a person's obligation to give compensation is 
only established if the damage is legally attributable to him. So primarily everyone is 
responsible for their loss by themselves, except when liability is transferred to another person 
by law. So this "basic norm" according to the PETL article 1:101 points out firstly general 
conditions for liability, that another person suffered harm. Secondly, that tort law harm needs 
to be compensated by paying damages which are not only to compensate the victim but also for 
prevention and as a punishment for the tortfeasor.40 
                                                 
37 Barfield 2018, p. 194. 
38As said on their website (http://www.egtl.org/), they are a group of scholars in the area of tort law established in 
1992. They have drafted a collection of Principles of European Tort Law. 
39 Busnelli and others 2005, p. 19. 
40 Busnelli and others 2005, p. 19. 
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The same kind of explanation is also stated in the German Civil Code, "Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch" (BGB). The general liability rules are in its Section 823 "Liability in damages". In 
that section, liability rules are explained as follows: 
"(1) A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, freedom, 
property or another right of another person is liable to make compensation to the other party for 
the damage arising from this. 
(2) The same duty is held by a person who commits a breach of a statute that is intended to protect 
another person. If according to the contents of the statute, it may also be breached without fault, 
then liability to compensation only exists in the case of fault." 
Cees van Dam explains in his book that the application of Section 823 (1) requires the 
infringement of a right, such as the rights to life, body, health, freedom, and property and in 
turn, the application of Section 823 (2) requires the violation of a statutory rule. He also adds 
that in Section 82641 of BGB is another general rule of liability and that the application of that 
section requires intentional unethical conduct, "also known as intentional infliction of damage 
contra bonos mores".42 
In both of these definitions of liability, we can see the same or similar things. There need to be 
some harm inflicted by one person to another, and that harm needs to be inflicted intentionally 
or negligently (whose fault it is). Also, people can hold the act itself so dangerous that liability 
exists even if harm is inflected without fault or intention, or the contract/statute has been 
breached. Here it is easy to see that for there to be a liability; there has to be harm done first. If 
there is no harm, then there cannot be any liability. If someone has inflicted damage, we then 
need to look for the next criteria for how that harm is caused, and from these, we have two 
primary forms of liability: fault liability (intention and negligent); and strict liability. 
It is also good to mention that liability or the level of liability is not unchanging. According to 
John Buyers, liability is basically: 
"a sliding scale which is based factually on the degree of consequential legal responsibility society 
places on a person. Historically responsibility and hence liability levels are not static – the able 
minded and children and mentally incapable adults have different levels of liability – the latter 
                                                 
41 BGB section 826 (Intentional damage contrary to public policy): A person who, in a manner contrary to public 
policy, intentionally inflicts damage on another person is liable to the other person to make compensation for the 
damage. 
42 Van Dam 2013, p. 79. 
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having little or no responsibility for their actions and therefore a commensurate degree of low 
accountability and liability."43  
However, I do not continue with this subject any further, because that falls out the scope of this 
thesis. It is just good to be aware that liability levels can differ between different people at 
different times. Next, I am briefly explaining fault liability (liability caused by an intentional or 
negligent act), and strict liability separately, even though some things might be the same in 
more than just one category. I will just briefly explain their main points to help better follow 
the liability issues with AI later on. 
2.1.2 Fault liability – intention and negligence 
Fault can be divided into two different sections; intention which is deliberate wrong-doing, and 
negligent behaviour, which is non-intentional, and it causes unintended damage to others. 
Various degrees of fault can also be used to separate fault liability more accurately: intent, grave 
or gross fault or negligence, medium and finally slight fault or negligence.44 However, here I 
just refer to just intention and negligence and not to all those different degrees as they are not 
so relevant here. 
According to Article 4:101 of PETL: "A person is liable on the basis of fault for intentional or 
negligent violation of the required standard of conduct".45 Here fault can be objectively 
understood as a deviation from or violation of the required standard of conduct46, which can be 
wilful (so intentional breach of the required standard) or failing to act with the required care 
and precaution as could be fair to assume (negligent violation of the required standard).47 
In Germany, for the person to be liable because of the fault requires that he violated the codified 
rule, his behaviour has been unlawful and that he has acted negligently or intentionally. 
                                                 
43 Buyers 2015, p. 1. 
44 Busnelli and others 2005, p. 66. 
45 Busnelli and others 2005, p. 68. 
46  Required standard of conduct is explained in the art. 4:102 paragraph 1 of PETL. It is explained there that the 
reasonable person in the circumstances, and depends, in particular, on the nature and value of the protected interest 
involved, the dangerousness of the activity, the expertise to be expected of a person carrying it on, the foreseeability 
of the damage, the relationship of proximity or special reliance between those involved, as well as the availability 
and the costs of precautionary or alternative methods. 
47 Busnelli and others 2005, pp. 69-70. 
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However, as BGB does not provide grounds for intention, as a general rule for the intention in 
Germany, there are two different requirements for intention. First is a "knowledge 
requirement", which requires that there is at least an awareness that the occurrence of harm is 
possible, and the second one is a "voluntary requirement", which requires that the person at 
least accepts the damage if it occurs. Both need to be present regarding the violation of protected 
interests or the statutory rule, and unlawfulness of this violation or conduct.48 
Negligence in Germany is codified in Section 276 BGB. Pursuant to this Section, a person's 
action is negligent if he fails to exercise reasonable care, which is the level of care required in 
society. As an example of this level of care is a situation, where a rotten tree falls and causes 
injury to a passer. The owner of the tree would breach his safety duty if he omitted to secure or 
remove the tree. The breach of this safety duty implies unlawfulness and is an example of the 
most crucial aspect of negligence, "the outer care". The other element is "the inner care", and it 
stands for the personal features of the person, especially for the person's knowledge of the 
possible risk and for his ability to prevent that risk to come true. If, however, even a careful 
person could not have recognised and avoided the risk, then the negligence requirement does 
not actualise.49 
In the American common law system, negligence is based in the same way. The elements of 
negligence are duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages. For duty, there must be a 
foreseeable plaintiff and a suitable standard of care. Commonly, a plaintiff is foreseeable if he 
is close by within the zone of physical danger as, of course, the defendant has no duty to persons 
who are physically far away. Same as in BGB, a breach occurs if the defendant fails to exercise 
reasonable care, in which the general standard is that of a reasonable person. However, the 
standard differs between people and, for example, transport companies have a high standard of 
care, where even the slightest negligence may qualify as a breach. On the other side of the chart 
are the children who have a lower standard of care.50 
There are two types of causation, actual and proximate. Actual causation is a "but for" test: But 
for the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff would not have suffered the harm. As for proximate 
                                                 
48 Van Dam 2013, pp. 227-228. 
49 Van Dam 2013, pp. 227, 231-232. 
50 Schaerer – Kelley – Nicolescu 2009, p. 74. 
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causation, it is a foreseeability test: that the defendant's conduct, which harms the plaintiff, 
needs to be foreseeable. For an act to cause harm, both of these tests must be met. Under the 
doctrine called "eggshell skull", the defendant is responsible for the full extent of the damages, 
foreseeable and unforeseeable, if the plaintiff can prove that there are actual damages. However, 
the defendant has also some defences to defend himself against accusations of negligent 
conduct. He may claim that the plaintiff was negligent or that the plaintiff assumed the risk. By 
the traditional rule of contributory negligence, if the plaintiff was even a bit negligent in causing 
the accident, he may not get any recovery.51 
As of a generally accepted rule, the negligent character of the defendant's conduct is established 
by balancing the expected risk and the precautions, meaning that when the danger increases, so 
must the precautions increase. According to Van Dam, the level of risk can be determined by:  
"(a) the seriousness of the expected damage and (b) the probability that an accident will happen. 
And the level of care can be broken down into: (c) the character and the benefit of the conduct 
and (d) the burden of precautionary measures."52 
Van Dam states that this approach is from the considerations of the famous American judge 
Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. The case concerned vessels that were not 
fastened to their moorings, thus causing damage. Learned Hand stated: 
"Since there are occasions when every vessel will break away from her moorings, and since, if 
she does, she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, 
to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) the probability that she 
will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injuries, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate 
precautions."53 
An intentional unlawful act results from an intentional act, which is based on the act itself, 
intent to do that act and a causal link between the action and the infringement. If being subject 
to an intentional act, then unlike in negligent acts, the plaintiff is not usually required to prove 
actual damages, and he may demand nominal and punitive damages from the tortfeasor. 
Intentional torts include, among other things, battery, trespass to personal property or land, 
theft, and nuisance. Naturally, the defendant has also some defences available. For example, he 
may argue that the plaintiff consented to the act. He may even claim defence of himself, others, 
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or property.54 A clear example of having consent can be found in sports like boxing where both 
parties know and have the permission of being punched in a way that would be battery outside 
of the ring. Naturally, when playing contact sports, both athletes understand what they signed 
for, and that suffering damages is part of the game. However, there is a cap of the damage too 
and, for example, if the other one gives up, then any punch or kick made after that would not 
be any more under the consent. 
Negligence and things like a duty of care and the level of risk are important factors when 
speaking about the liability of AI. At least yet, when AI is not self-thinking and capable of 
making independent decisions itself, it is hard to hold AI liable because of intentionally doing 
things, unless of course, someone would have programmed it to harm.  In typical scenarios, this 
is not the case, and it is not in the intention of AI or anyone involved in the making of that AI 
to do harm. Instead, accidents can always happen and here the level of risk the AI has, and the 
duty of care, play an essential part. Nevertheless, in a next subsection about the liable party 
when AI causes damages, I will focus on both negligence and intention when looking for 
specific liability questions regarding AI and discuss the possibility to make AI liable by itself. 
2.1.3 Strict liability 
Strict liability in its essence means liability even if a person did nothing wrong, did not intend 
to cause harm, or there is not any fault in a person's active or passive doing. So even if there 
has not been any breach of a contract or negligent or intentional behaviour for causing harm, 
the person could still be liable for the injury and damage inflicted on others in certain situations. 
Strict liability can also be called as a liability for risk because risk or danger are the main factors 
to form a liability, which has as its basis, the idea of compensation of risk and the profit.55 
Dangerous activity is one of those situations which is affected by strict liability, and some 
definition for this is given in PETL article 5:101 as follows:  
“(1) A person who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is strictly liable for damage 
characteristic to the risk presented by the activity and resulting from it. 
(2) An activity is abnormally dangerous if 
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a) it creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of damage even when all due care is exercised 
in its management and 
b) it is not matter of common usage. 
(3) A risk of damage may be significant having regard to the seriousness or the likelihood of the 
damage. 
(4) This Article does not apply to an activity which is specifically subjected to strict liability by 
any other provision of these Principles or any other national law or international convention.”56  
Strict liability, as described here, means in situations like this, there is a highly significant risk 
of harm, even though the defendant has taken all proper precautions. Still, strict liability is not 
always applicable, because there is a limit even for strict liability: "the damage has to be 
characteristic to the risk presented by the activity and resulting from it". Therefore only the 
damage mentioned above can be recovered under this Article, which reduces the scope to those 
cases where the cause of the harm evidences the reason for establishing strict liability.57 As an 
example, explosives are held as dangerous things and whoever uses or stores them has strict 
liability towards them, so if they explode and do harm, the owner would be liable for the 
damages because of the strict liability. However, if said explosives were stored in a box and 
that box would fall and damage someone, this kind of damage would not fall under the scope 
of strict liability, because it is not characteristic of the risk presented. Of course, that then could 
fall under some other liability provision than strict liability. 
The example from above is not the only example of strict liability, nor is it in any way 
exhaustive. Van Dam states that "strict liability can be considered as liability without 
negligence, but elements of negligence may still play a role in rules of strict liability". As for 
examples, he mentions that the strict liability of the employer for damage caused by his 
employee (vicarious liability) requires the employee's negligent conduct. On the other hand, 
strict liability for a defective product contains elements in the requirement of defect that are 
similar to the aspects of negligent conduct. Even rules for damage caused in 'pure' strict liability 
usually contains defences which have signs of negligence. One of the defences in liability for 
things in French law is the external cause that was unforeseeable and insurmountable.58 In 
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American common law, the defendant may claim that the plaintiff presumed the risk or that the 
warning in the product was sufficient.59 
Often strict liability rules are used when movable objects, which have higher than average risk, 
cause damage. These objects include, among other things, motor vehicles and animals and they 
are considered to be inherently or inevitably dangerous: they have a high chance for accidents. 
If accidents would happen, they are likely to cause severe damage, i.e. death and serious 
personal injury.60 However, in the case of an animal, the animal itself does not have liability, 
but the owner of the animal has it. For instance, in some states in the US, strict liability is used 
in connection with pets, usually dogs which bite or attack. That is because animals do not have 
a conscience, and therefore animal keepers have to restrain them from avoiding harm.61  
The keeper of the animal, who has the actual power over the animal, has strict liability also in 
Germany. That rule aims to protect against specific animal risks like death, personal injury, and 
property damage caused by the particular danger inherent in keeping an animal.62 Other forms 
of strict liability include an abnormally dangerous activity and strict product liability, which 
applies to a commercial supplier and in that case the product may be defective based on 
defective manufacture, faulty design, and inadequate warning.63 The same kind of legislation 
governing abnormally dangerous activities, dangerous animals and product liability are also in 
the US where they are under strict liability.64 
The EU also has its own definition of strict liability in its legislation, which mainly targets the 
manufacturers. According to Van Dam, "the Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on 
the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products" (Product Liability Directive) gives a good and 
well-known example of strict liability. By the Product Liability Directive Article 1 "the 
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producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his product" and by Article 6 "a 
product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, 
taking all circumstances into account". 
Van Dam adds that Article 6 of the Product Liability Directive is a mirror of the negligence test 
which, quite often in cases, actually refers to the safety the claimant was entitled to expect, even 
though it focuses on the defendant's negligent conduct. He continues that the connection 
between defect and negligence is found in Article 2 providing that to establish the defectiveness 
of a product, the court has to consider the presentation and the reasonably expected use of the 
product. These elements are also relevant when establishing negligence. The difference 
between the tests is that the defectiveness test uses the product instead of the producer as a 
reference. This is suitable, especially in cases of manufacturing defects, because the tests have 
a difference in the results, unlike in cases of design defects.65 
Under the US law, there is "strict liability negligence", which applies to products that are 
defective or unreasonably dangerous when used in a standard, intended or reasonably 
foreseeable manner, and which cause injury.66 In the case of robots, this would apply, as they 
could be seen as products. However, when talking about other AI applications, like software, 
one could wonder if the software is held as a product or more like a service. According to the 
case Ransome v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, electricity "is a form of energy that can 
be made or produced by men, confined, controlled, transmitted and distributed to be used as an 
energy source for heat, power and light and is distributed in the stream of commerce. The 
distribution might well be a service, but the electricity itself, in the contemplation of the 
ordinary user, is a consumable product."67 Therefore we could also define software as a product 
rather than a service.68 Assuming that the software is a product, it becomes a responsibility on 
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the developers of AI systems to make sure that their systems are free from design defects, 
manufacturing defects and inadequate warning or instructions.69 
 The liable party when Artificial Intelligence causes damages 
2.2.1 Liability of the manufacturer and developer 
The frame for the manufacturer's general liability gives the Product Liability Directive and 
especially its Articles 1 and 6. Under Article 1, the producer shall be liable for damage caused 
by a defect in the product. Under Article 6, a product is defective when it does not provide the 
safety which a person is entitled to expect. Since robots and almost all AI applications can be 
seen as some kind of product, this gives a sound basis also for the manufacturer's liability over 
AI. It means that if the AI application has a defect, in the end, the manufacturer has the liability, 
which is almost always a strict liability, so the manufacturer can be liable even if he does not 
even know about the defect. 
Therefore, if a robot is defective in manufacture or design, or it does not have an adequate 
warning label, a plaintiff injured by that robot may hold the robot's manufacturer strictly liable 
for damages. The criteria for the strict liability of the manufacturer are that the robot 
manufacturer is a commercial supplier and that the robot is defective at the time of sale. If these 
criteria are met, the robot manufacturer is liable even if the robot owner would have been 
negligent. This possibility of strict liability gives robot manufacturers an incentive to avoid 
defects in the manufacture and design of their robots and to place adequate warning labels on 
their robots.70 If manufacturers would not have strict liability, it could be that they would not 
care too much about the result and the product could end up with minor defects just because the 
manufacturer wanted to save money and maybe the robots have some production error in it. 
The issue of manufacturers saving money from safety measures would be possible if there 
would not be any sanctions for the lack of safety measures or the manufacturer would not be 
responsible for defects. These safety measures add extra costs to the product and do not give 
any other benefit to the product. So in case, the manufacturer would only think about money, 
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there would not be hardly any safety measures. In my opinion, even this reason is enough to 
make manufacturers strictly liable for defects. Another reason is that usually, manufacturers are 
in a better economic situation than individual people and thus they are better prepared for the 
losses and have more money reimburse damages or new products. Sometimes, monetary wise, 
it is better for the manufacturer to pay the bill. 
It is also worth noting that at first, it may sound easy to put manufacturer liable for the damages 
because if there is a defect in the robot lawnmower and that is why it hit someone and caused 
damage, the manufacturer is strictly liable because of that defect. However, the analyse about 
who is liable might get more complicated when looking at the liable person when a self-driving 
car causes an accident. A self-driving car does not consist of only the vehicle itself, as there is 
also an operating software, navigation sensors and external map data, and these all must work 
together for the car to work.71  
There may then also be arguments about if the developer, programmer or someone else is liable 
too for the fault to some extent. In this situation, the contributory negligence could come in 
question.72 That could be the case if two or more of these components cause the damage. An 
excellent example of this is a surgical robot. If an adverse outcome happens, so something goes 
wrong in the surgery, questions could arise about whether the robot had defective hardware or 
programming, if it was improperly maintained, or if it was insufficiently monitored. These kinds 
of claims base on both product liability and medical malpractice law, and they focus on alleged 
design defects and user negligence.73 
What comes to design defects in the US, many of the state courts take a risk-utility approach. 
That means that they consider whether the benefits of using a product as designed outweigh the 
risks of harm associated with the design. Often in these cases, a key consideration is whether a 
reasonable alternative design would have avoided the damage. Then again, some state courts 
consider customer expectations, which is a more subjective approach. However, in this 
approach, inaccurate judgments are possible because, by background and experience, jurors can 
only speculate as to what a customer might expect. This kind of guessing does not result in 
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valid decision making in cases, which involves exceptionally complicated products. That is 
because consumer expectations about, for example, available safety features may be higher or 
lower than what technology allows or they may not consider how a maximum safety in a 
product can be achieved in various situations.74 Furthermore, the manufacturers of self-driving 
cars cannot avoid liability just because these cars are usually safer than non-automated vehicles. 
Even if a human-driven car with various systems that ease driving is safer on the than a vehicle 
without these systems, the manufacturer of the car would still be liable if a reasonable 
alternative design for the combined systems could have prevented the injury.75 
Even though it could feel like the manufacturers would be liable in almost any issue there is 
with the autonomous machines, they still have some defences available in traditional product 
liability suits, at least in the US. Applicable arguments in cases involving robots or other AI 
products include whether someone changed or modified the product after the sale or if it was 
misused in an unforeseeable or unreasonable manner (for example programmed or commanded 
to complete tasks for which it was not designed). Courts can also consider whether there was 
contributory negligence, so if the user or the victim deliberately engaged in risky behaviour 
under principles of comparative fault. In addition, as already mentioned earlier, there need to 
be adequate labelling in the product. So the manufacturer may also protect itself from liability 
by providing appropriate instructions for using the product, and by warning users of possible 
dangers or risks that the manufacturer cannot eliminate without an expensive and complete 
change to the product's design.76 
According to the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform's report, a critical overriding issue 
concerning robotics and generally AI in the future will be whether a designer's or manufacturer's 
conduct can continue to be evaluated under the product liability principles when a product is a 
self-learning product and changing after its sale. The question here is that should AI 
applications be treated as "persons" rather than as "products"?77 Manufacturing defects, which 
are abnormalities in the design of a product, are subject to strict liability. While AI products 
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may be alike when they are made, they could have developed their own behaviour before the 
user gets the product. Whether a product has a manufacturing defect is evaluated based on its 
condition at the time of sale. That would preclude a manufacturing defect claim when an AI 
product was manufactured to design specifications but then later changed. The situation may 
be more complicated if the AI product's design is defective. AI products are designed to self-
modify during use, which could preclude a design defect claim. As products become more 
autonomous all the time, traditional product liability law may fall to negligence principles, 
which might focus on whether the product's action was reasonably foreseeable and could have 
been avoided through exercising due care.78 
All in all, I would conclude that having manufacturers strictly liable for AI products is well 
justified. If the owner of the AI product gets injured because of his defective AI product, it 
would no be fair to suffer the damages alone. Furthermore, it would not be fair either to acquit 
the manufacturer from liability just because the AI application would not be considered as a 
product by law and thus would free manufacturer from liability in multiple cases. However, the 
legislation needs to be amended to actually cover AI products, so it would be clear if the 
manufacturer is responsible or not. It is not fair for a manufacturer to be liable for acts of a self-
modifying product, especially a long time after it has been manufactured. In my opinion, the 
only good answer to this is amending the legislation to consider these situations. As for now, 
no one can be 100 per cent sure, if the manufacturer is or should be liable for acts of self-
modifying robot, which could be very different from the robot, which was manufactured. In 
case of that kind of robots, I would keep the approach of seeing them more like persons than 
products better, thus shifting the liability from the manufacturer to the robot itself. 
2.2.2 Liability of the owner and the user  
2.2.2.1 Robots as animals 
In addition to the manufacturer's liability, the owner of the robot could be held liable. Liability 
could arise because of the owner's strict liability for the robot, the machine itself doing 
something to cause liability or just because of the owner's negligence, that is lack of supervision 
over the robot, can make the owner liable for the damage. Some machines could also need 
constant monitoring, and if the owner neglects this duty, the victim could also hold the owner 
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liable for negligence even though the manufacturer would also be liable. This could be the case 
if the criteria for the strict liability are not met, which means that for the victim to get 
compensation for the damages, he may hold the owner liable among other things for negligent 
supervision, in which the victim’s recovery could be affected by his actions.79 
One possible scenario to sort out liability issues is to treat robots as animals, so to handle the 
robot’s liability as they would be animals, which would mean that the owner would be the liable 
party instead of the robot. By comparing robots as animals, I mean animals whom someone 
owns, like “normal” domesticated animals like dogs or cats or more dangerous animals like 
police dogs or snakes. This approach has also been proposed as one idea by the U.S. Chamber 
Institute for Legal Reform in their report, which mentions that courts and legislatures could also 
look at liability principles developed to address injuries from pets. As the authors state, here the 
person sued does not fully control the actions of the animal that led to injury, but he or she 
could be liable for the consequences in some situations.80 
So who has the liability and what kind of liability for damage done by the animal? The animal 
itself would be quite hard to hold liable and demand to pay damages, but its owner can. Some 
background to animals' liability gives the Animals Act 1971 of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom. Under subsection 1, section 2:  
"Where any damage is caused by an animal which belongs to a dangerous species, any person 
who is a keeper of the animal is liable for the damage, except as otherwise provided by this Act." 
Then under subsection 2 are the provisions for when the owner of the not dangerous animal is 
liable for the damage done by that animal. Those provisions are that  
"a.) the damage is of a kind which the animal, unless restrained, was likely to cause or which, if 
caused by the animal, was likely to be severe"; and 
b.) the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal 
which are not normally found in animals of the same species or are not normally so found except 
at particular times or in particular circumstances; and  
c.) those characteristics were known to that keeper or were at any time known to a person who at 
that time had charge of the animal as that keeper's servant or, where that keeper is the head of a 
household, were known to another keeper of the animal who is a member of that household and 
under the age of sixteen."  
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Furthermore, under section 5 are exceptions to the liability provided in sections 2 to 4. Those 
exceptions include that the person [owner of the animal] is not liable under sections 2 to 4 of 
this Act for any damage which is entirely the fault of the person suffering it or if the suffered 
person has voluntarily accepted the risk thereof. In addition, he will not be liable for any damage 
caused by an animal kept on any premises or structure to a person trespassing there, if the animal 
was not kept there for protection or if it was kept there for protection, the purpose for it must 
not have been unreasonable. 
As can be seen from those sections, the animal’s owner is responsible for any damage caused 
by his animal. However, the liability is shifted entirely or partly to the victim if the damage was 
his fault.  These same provisions could be used when examining the robot’s owner liability. 
Kelley, Schaerer, Gomez, and Nicolescu argue in their article that the law should hold robot 
owners to the same standard of negligence as the owners of domesticated animals. According 
to them, a robot is programmed to follow a particular behaviour. So, even though the robot can 
make some decisions by itself, it still acts in the way it is programmed. This makes robots much 
more predictable in the same way as domesticated animals and not as unpredictable like wild 
animals, whose owners are strictly liable. Hence, this kind of programming makes robots 
behaviour more like a well-trained dog, which usually does as he is trained. 81  
To the same results came Schaerer with Kelley and Nicolescu a couple of years earlier. They 
proposed that the robot could be treated like a domesticated animal if it is fully functional, but 
its owner acts negligently.82 They explain that robots are more equivalent to animals, which act 
on their own, than to everyday products, which are not as autonomous and do not move by 
themselves. Authors also claim that robots are closer to domesticated animals than to wild 
animals. Therefore they should be subject to negligence liability like domesticated animals 
rather than to strict liability. Their reason is that domesticated animals are more predictable than 
dangerous wild animals. That is why owners of such animals do not have as demanding 
negligence standards by law. Likewise, the owners of robots should have the same standard of 
negligence by law.83 
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However, all kinds of robots probably should not be treated as the same, and their owners should 
not have the same level of liability even though they would not be held as a wild and 
unpredictable like wild animals. For example, the owner of a dangerous attack dog could be 
held strictly liable for the dog, if the owner does not warn trespassers of the dangerous dog in 
the premises and in the same way owner of dangerous security robot could have stricter liability 
standards.84 From different animals, dogs are maybe closest to robots as robots and dogs both 
can be divided into different breeds and group. Also (dangerous) dogs have more laws85 
governing them than there are for other dangerous animals, so the comparison is more 
meaningful in point of view of the law. There are, for example, medical robots, service robots, 
military/guarding robots and industrial robots and like some dog breeds, some robot groups are 
more dangerous by their nature than others. 86  
As a person probably would not typically hold small poodle dangerous per se, in the same way, 
little vacuuming robot is not held hazardous machine. Then on the other side of the "dangerous 
chart" are, for example, fighting dogs that are kept dangerous. This is illustrated well in the 
Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which specifies hazardous dogs and what to do with them. Under 
subsection 1 section 1 of the act, dangerous dogs are dogs that are bred for fighting like pit bull 
terrier, Japanese tosa and any dog of any type designated for this section by order of the 
Secretary of State, being a type appearing to him to be bred for fighting or to have the 
characteristics of a type bred for that purpose. In the same manner, robots made for fighting 
purposes, like those aforementioned guarding robots, are more dangerous ones. Hence, their 
owners should be held strictly liable for their damage, like the owner of a dangerous dog is. 
Laws could also govern dangerous robots in the same way as dogs, or more accurately, 
dangerous dogs are. 
Owner of a dangerous robot having strict liability also goes along with more general strict 
liability rules. As mentioned earlier, strict liability rules apply especially with movable objects, 
like motor vehicles and dangerous animals. That is because they have higher than average risk 
to cause damage, as they have a high chance for accidents and possible accidents would likely 
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cause grave harm, like death and serious personal injury.87 And because the animal or the motor 
vehicle itself cannot be held liable, the liable party is the owner of the animal or vehicle. What 
then comes to dangerous robots or any dangerous AI application, they could be compared to 
either dangerous animal or motor vehicles. That is at least in the sense that dangerous robots 
have a higher chance for accidents and those accidents could be severe, especially when talking 
about armed robots. A dangerous robot can also be defined in legal terms so that dangerousness 
hinges on if advanced technology provides for machines capable of acting as a reasonable 
person in the law of torts, which is guarding against foreseeable harm. When the robot has been 
found not to achieve such a capability, it should be deemed dangerous.88 
Pets, like robots, are capable of making independent decisions and interact with people. In 
general, pet owners have to prevent the animal from injuring others. Under the US common 
law, most jurisdictions have a so-called “one bite” rule, which provides that when the owner 
knows that his pet is harmful, he is strictly liable for attacks. Some states have even enacted 
statutes that impose strict liability for dog bites in particular situations or if the animal qualifies 
as a “dangerous dog” based on its breed. However, if the victim provokes the dog into biting 
himself, an owner may have a defence to liability. Also, owners of guard dogs, who post 
warning signs, may be able to reduce or avoid liability through the application of principles of 
assumption of risk or comparative fault. A robots-as-pets approach might appropriately balance 
owner responsibility, robot unpredictability, the level of risk of the particular robot based on its 
function, and the conduct of the person who was injured.89 In a way, these statutes sound quite 
much like the Dangerous Dog Act 1991. 
However, there could be situations where the owner is not liable. In the US, the person who 
could be liable because of the damage done by the animal does not necessarily need to be the 
actual owner of the animal. In a case from Georgia, a person got bitten by a pit bull and got 
severe injuries. Instead of suing the dog’s actual owner, who was the third roommate of the 
defendant, he asserted liability to another person who was the owner of the house, because of 
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Georgia’s animal statute and premises liability law.90 If this ruling were extended to robots in 
like the other rules governing animals, then in situations where the robot and its owner are 
visiting some other person’s house, the owner of the house would be liable for the damages 
done by the robot instead of the owner of the robot. Personally, I am not sure this would be a 
good way to handle the liability, but it is one possibility. 
 
2.2.2.2 Robots as employees and agents 
It can also be added that the employer is liable for the injuries committed by the employee 
within the scope of the employee's employment, even if the employer used reasonable care in 
hiring, training, and supervising the employee. This doctrine is primarily based on the view that 
fairness requires the employer to be held liable for torts committed by the employees. When 
looking this from the point of view of the AI, artificial persons like corporations can only act 
through human employees and, thus, can only be liable vicariously. These policy reasons are 
based on the unique nature of human employees, like the ability of humans to act as responsible 
agents for an artificial person and to do business. For this reason, the application of those 
policies to a robot can are questionable so long until the robot's capacities approach the 
capacities of humans, especially the ability to engage in complicated intellectual interaction as 
a self-conscious member of a community. However, if the robot would have those 
characteristics, then the legal system would have to decide could that kind of robot even be 
owned. If the answer to this question is "no," then a robot with self-ownership should also be 
liable in tort in the same way that an employee is accountable for his torts regardless of whether 
the employer is vicariously liable under respondent superior.91 This aspect I am looking more 
in the next sub-section. 
Finally, the owner’s responsibility and liability could also emerge in a situation where a robot 
acts as an agent. Agency is a relationship, which is created by contract or by operation of law. 
In agency the principal party grants authority to another party, called the agent, to act on behalf 
of and under control of the principal to deal with a third party. Mainly, the actions of the agent 
bind the principal so for example, if IoT speaker orders lots of music from online, by the 
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principles of agency law, a court may find that such decision bounds the owner. The AI 
application could act, based on its programming, with either the owner authorising it or, because 
the robot’s action would give the impression to a reasonable person that it was allowed to act, 
with indisputable authority.92 This approach is well justified also on the basis of the US 
Computer Information Act 15 U.S.C. § 7001(h), according to which that a contract “may not 
be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely because its formation, creation or 
delivery involved the action of one or more electronic agent so long as the action of any such 
electronic agent is legally attributable to the person to be bound.” 
An excellent example of a robot-agent binding decision can be found from the USA as the U.S. 
Court of Appeals has found that the actions of robots can bound businesses. According to the 
U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, in the case from the year 2004, a website design 
company called Verio had created an automated software application to identify new websites 
and collect the contact information of those who register the sites. The “search robot” would 
submit multiple queries to the “WHOIS” -system93 and Verio would then use this information 
to send marketing requests, among other things by email and direct mail to those people. The 
problem was that when receiving the results of a WHOIS query, users also received terms of 
use stating: “that under no circumstances will you use this data to … support the transmission 
of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitation via email.” One of the reasons Verio 
countered the accusation was that it did not enter a legally enforceable contract when its search 
robot collected information from the database. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals was not 
persuaded by Verio, and it maintained a preliminary injunction against them. Although the court 
did not explicitly apply principles of agency law, it found that Verio was bound by the 
restrictions triggered by its search robots.94 
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2.2.2.3 Analysis of the owner’s liability 
In my opinion, the analogy between animals and robots is quite good. As robots are usually 
programmed in a certain way, and they have an owner to command them, or at least supervise 
them, therefore equating robots to trained dogs or another domesticated animal makes sense. 
Then it also makes sense to hold the owner of the robot liable in the same way as the owner of 
the animal. Of course, there could be a problem with the programming, or some robots could 
be programmed in malicious purposes. Still, in this case, the consumer-owner would not be 
liable anymore if he did not know and he should not even have known about those malicious 
purposes, after which the liability goes to the programmer or manufacturer. The owner should 
be held liable for negligence if he does not do as said on the instructions, or he does not keep 
on eye his robot, and because of that, it causes damage.  
Owners should also bear the risk of owning dangerous robots and hold them strictly liable if 
they cause harm. Be it an armed security robot or self-made robotic lawnmower equipped with 
a flamethrower or additional blades. They are both potentially dangerous (even though typical 
robotic lawnmower is not so deadly) so they should be treated as dangerous animals. Besides, 
in the worst case, they could and should be ordered to be destroyed, like is the situation in some 
countries with dangerous dogs95. Still, comparing robots to animals is not fruitful in every 
possible case, especially regarding strict liability and the potential reduction of the burden of 
proof, although it is suitable, but so is those other possible comparisons. My point here is that 
the effective legislation is not enough for new technology, and as is seen in later sections, 
legislators are already working on this issue.  
As an example, Ugo Pagallo states that the burden of proof can reduce strict liability. This 
means that, for instance, after an animal provoked harm, owners or avoid responsibility by 
proving that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of the injury or show that an unexpected 
event occurred. Analogously, in the case of strict liability for the behaviour of children, some 
legal systems give immunity when parents prove they could not prevent that harmful behaviour. 
The same principle applies to producers of dangerous products when if they can show that they 
carefully followed the precise regulation. However, these legal rules often fall short in coping 
with the advancement of technology. Maybe individual robots may behave as a reasonable 
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person in the field of tort law, guarding against foreseeable harm. However, should we see 
robots as children, so preventing the actions of robots, or should we see them as animals, so 
prove that an unexpected event has occurred? Would such responsibility differ according to the 
different typology of robots with which we are confronted?96 
2.2.3 Liability of the robot itself 
Even though it is not the situation yet, but possibly in the future there may come situations in 
which AI products act in a way that is beyond the control of designers, manufacturers, or 
owners. For example, employers are usually liable for the damage done by the employees, 
except when damage was done intentionally or if an employee would commit an assault. Also, 
a pet owner may not be liable when a puppy that had always been gentle bites a child who enters 
its yard. As already established earlier in subsection 2.1, a person can be liable based on an 
intentional or negligent violation of the required standard of conduct, meaning that the liability 
is based on control, foreseeability, and fault (or then in some cases strict liability for example 
for dangerous activities).  
Once again, according to the authors of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal reform’s report, 
one possible answer to situations in which the designer, manufacturer, or owner of an AI 
product may not be liable under existing principles is to understand the purpose of tort law. It 
is not just to compensate a person who has experienced an injury, but to do so because of the 
other party’s wrongful action caused that harm. That means that one answer to the question 
about the liable party may also be to recognize AI entities themselves as responsible for their 
own actions. Some people even suggest that there could be a bit limited form of a “personhood” 
for AI technology that we will interact within the same manner as people.97 
Giving some sort of legal status to AI entities would make them able to enter into legally binding 
contracts, which would make them competent to, for example, order goods and services. This 
would mean that recognizing robots as legal entities could protect the owner of the robot in 
situations in which the technology caused an accident while acting autonomously so the owner 
would not be responsible for the action. For this, according to some people, the technology 
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itself would need to have some kind of insurance on its own to cover possible claims. Legal 
status or limited personhood might also provide some other rights to AI entities. These rights 
could be inter alia to be able to own the intellectual property that it creates, such as software 
code, music, articles, or books in the same way humans own the intellectual rights of their 
creations. This idea would not even be too farfetched, as corporations have those same rights 
already and they are still ultimately owned by individuals. Furthermore, the owners then benefit 
financially from the corporation’s intellectual property rights. In this point of view, it seems 
possible that AI entities with property and other legal rights would also be subject to ownership, 
and that their owners would then also be the ultimate financial beneficiaries.98 
The subject of robots having legal rights is not just some discussion in the books and reports, 
but there has also been discussion about it in the legislation level. In “The European Parliament 
resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules 
on Robotics” (the Civil Law Rules on Robotics) the European Parliament has considered the 
issue of robots’ liability. In resolution’s paragraph 49, they state:  
“that the civil liability for damage caused by robots is a crucial issue which also needs to be 
analysed and addressed at Union level in order to ensure the same degree of efficiency, 
transparency and consistency in the implementation of legal certainty throughout the European 
Union for the benefit of citizens, consumers and businesses”. 
In the Civil Law Rules on Robotics, there is a discussion on different approaches to this issue 
and about mandatory insurances,99 which I am going to discuss more on the next section. In the 
resolution, the Parliament has also thought about future legislature in long-term perspective; 
creating a special legal status for robots, so giving them electronic personality and recognizing 
them as electronic persons. This would make robots liable for any damage that would have been 
caused by the autonomous behaviour of the robot. According to law professor Gerhard Wagner, 
the idea of ePersons is “the most innovative, interesting and stimulating idea within the 
Parliament’s resolution”.100 And I agree with Wagner. The idea is not only interesting, but it 
would help in many situations, where the liable party is not found easily and it would help the 
victim to get compensation for the damages, as there would not be any doubts about the liable 
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party. The idea is also very innovative, as it would be one big step towards making robots more 
like humans and maybe in the near future we would have robots living alongside humans at 
least in some way.  
Still, the question here is that is it realistic at all that autonomous machines would be intelligent 
enough to make their own decisions or would they just do as programmed, so if the idea giving 
ePersonality to robots would be even relevant. But as Wagner says, that question is more of a 
technological nature and not for lawyers to discuss (and thus not in the scope of this thesis). 
The real legal problem is whether autonomous machines should be given entity status, on the 
assumption that and at the point in time when they have acquired the required capabilities. 
Furthermore, Wagner also states that legal systems also take it for granted that humans are 
persons, “legal subjects”. So whether some human being is really able to think for himself, set 
its goals autonomously, and develop emotional ties towards others, is irrelevant. He continues 
that “[t]his strategy of defining legal subjectivity not with a view towards certain intellectual 
and emotional capabilities, but simply based on belonging to the human race, suggests that the 
expansion of entity status to non-human actors is not a question of capabilities. It is rather a 
decision for the legal system to make.”101 However, in case AI would be completely 
autonomous (like superintelligence), then the AI product must be aware of its actions. And if it 
is aware of its activities, it must be liable for its activities.102 
There also might be problems with making autonomous machines legal entities who may be 
held liable for damages. One problem would be that in that case, all the people behind robots, 
such as owner and manufacturer, would be protected from liability. Whether this is good or bad 
is maybe open to debate and depends on the party. On the other hand, the owner could rest well, 
knowing that if his robot harms someone, he would not be liable. On the other side, this could 
mean that all the incentives to take care would be lost. If the manufacturer were not held liable 
for any manufacturing mistakes there would be in the robot when it was done, then they would 
not need to pay so much attention and money for making good quality robots. Wagner compares 
this situation to the limited liability of shareholders and calls manufacturers and owners as 
“quasi-shareholders” of the robot as they would be protected from the robot liability in the same 
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way as shareholders are protected from the liability of the company.103 In my opinion, this could 
be a risk when giving legal status to robots, although I think it would not need to be like this. 
For example, robots could be kind of held as children so that they would be liable, but their 
owners could also be responsible for the damage robots do. 
Lastly, one more thing to think about giving robots a legal status is what other rights can be 
given to them. According to the British government study, in the future, robots could demand 
the same citizen’s rights as humans. This would mean that countries would need to provide 
social benefits, like healthcare and housing. Even though this is not something to look for right 
now, and it is still just a prediction in a paper, robots could have some responsibilities and 
rights. The study says that in the next 20 to 50 years, robots could be granted rights, so they 
could for example vote and pay taxes, and on the other hand, societies would have to take care 
of their new digital citizens.104  So if robots would be made as ePersons and they would be made 
liable for their decisions, maybe then there would be a need to give other rights and 
responsibilities to them too. 
Ultimately, I see the idea of giving the robots ePersonality as a very good idea, although for 
now there are some potential issues in it. The pros of the ePersonality are, for example, the clear 
definition of the liable party, easing the burden of the manufacturer and the owner in cases, 
where they could not have prevented the act of the autonomous product in any way and it could 
help the technology to evolve even more. However, there is also a negative side especially in 
giving rights to robots. Before they could be given legal rights like voting, we would need to 
make sure that the robots cannot be programmed or hacked to vote for a certain way, but they 
would need to make the voting decision on their own. There may also be some ethical issues, 
but I will not take stand for them here. All in all, I see this idea really good one and it would 
definitely provide a good answer to the issue of the liable party. Also just from the pure 
legislative perspective, I would say this would be a really huge thing and development. The 
idea about ePersonality would just need to be implemented worldwide for it to be useful. 
                                                 
103 Wagner 2018, pp. 20-21. 
104 BBC / Robots could demand legal rights. 
38 
 
3 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE REGULATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
 Artificial Intelligence regulation in the United States and the European Union 
3.1.1 The United States legislation and guidance on Artificial Intelligence  
For over two centuries, the US has addressed the concerns about the challenges of technological 
innovation, like the safety of the products and allocating the costs of victims’ injuries, with a 
complicated system of federal, state, and local governmental entities. They are all quite 
autonomous and uses both judicial and legislative/regulatory mechanisms to address injuries.105 
The same problem is also with the legislation governing AI and other new technology because 
the overlapping and potentially conflicting federal, state, and local regulation for example for 
AV’s and drone operation can pose severe impediments to deploying these new technologies. 
Such a legal patchwork creates an unreasonable risk that a manufacturer or user may 
unintentionally violate the law and thus become subject to liability. Federal agencies could 
prevent this problem by clearly asserting their intent to pre-empt state law, among other things, 
in regulations and agency guidance.106  
One example of the guidance the US has about AI is the National Highway Transportation and 
Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) voluntary guidance titled “Automated Driving Systems: A 
Vision for Safety 2.0.”, which was published in 2017. It intends to ease the process for 
manufacturing, testing, and deploying AVs while discouraging states from implementing their 
own AV regulations, which could be potentially conflicting. NHTSA’s Safety 2.0 focuses on 
automation levels three to five107 and covers all vehicles under the agency’s jurisdiction. The 
guidance describes 12 “priority safety elements” for consideration in the design, development, 
testing, and deployment of AV technologies. The guidance encourages companies engaged in 
testing and deploying of AVs to submit to NHSTA “Voluntary Safety Self- Assessment” letters 
demonstrating how they have addressed the safety elements, which, however, are not really 
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required.108 Furthermore, even though NHTSA has not adopted standards in terms of specific 
automation levels, it has adopted policies and regulations concerning particular technology. 
These policies are, for example, concerning electronic stability control, and it also has plans to 
address possible regulations on automatic braking technologies.109 
What comes to legislation, at the same time as NHTSA has released new guidance and updating 
old guidance, the US Congress has also taken up the issue of AVs. Apparently, the proposed 
legislation, which, if it becomes a law, may help to accelerate AV deployment. In addition to 
the Congress proposed legislation, the U.S. House of Representatives has passed “the Safely 
Ensuring Lives Future Deployment and Research In Vehicle Evolution Act” (short title SELF 
DRIVE Act)110, in September 2017 and also the Senate has its AV legislation pending called 
“the American Vision for Safer Transportation through Advancement of Revolutionary 
Technologies Act” (short title AV START Act). Although the Senate and House bills have some 
differences between each other, the good thing is that they both provide the federal government 
with a framework for developing AV rules. The bills would also obligate NHTSA to regulate 
the design, construction, and performance of the vehicles, to encourage their testing and 
deployment as well as authorize them to update Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. They 
would try to prevent state laws in the areas regulated by NHTSA, while preserving the states’ 
traditional authority to regulate, for example, registration, licensing, insurance, and traffic 
laws.111  
Maybe one of the essential elements of those bills is the preventing rule because launching AVs 
to markets would be much more complicated if states pass their own laws and regulations. For 
example, more than 40 US states have considered their own legislation for a couple of years, 
and 21 US states have already passed their own laws on AVs. The regulation situation with the 
AV’s can be compared to the legislation about drones. More than half of the states have rules 
about the use of drones and those laws govern areas like pre-emption of local and municipal 
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laws, privacy rights, commercial and governmental methods of drones and criminal penalties 
for misuse.112 Regarding the legislation on AV’s on states’ level, Nevada was the first state to 
adopt a plan to regulate autonomous cars, and its plan provides a useful example of a regulatory 
approach to experimental vehicles. In 2011, the Nevada Legislature adopted a bill defining AV 
and directing the Department of Motor Vehicles to establish regulations addressing, among 
other things, licensing operators of AV’s, operation of these vehicles on highways in the state, 
requirements and safety standards for the vehicles and insurance for operators of the vehicles.113 
Other guidance regarding AI, specifically IoT, is the Federal Trade Commission’s updated 
guidance complying with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). COPPA 
identifies IoT devices that collect personal data, like voice or GPS data, as covered under 
COPPA and has newly approved methods for obtaining parental consent regarding knowledge-
based authentication questions and using face recognition. Legislators have also introduced a 
Spy Car Act, which addresses concerns about data collecting cars, which may not be sufficiently 
secured, and a DIGIT Act, which would create a working group of federal agencies to provide 
recommendations to Congress on how to encourage the growth of IoT. However, after their 
introduction in 2017, either one has not advanced further.114 
However, it is, according to Hubbard, quite challenging to know when robots, like giant 
general-purpose robots equipped with the functional equivalents of human arms and hands, will 
be available for consumer markets and what risks would come with them. Hence, a specific 
regulatory plan could be difficult to prepare at this time and attempts to do so too early might 
impose arbitrary limits on innovation. On the other hand, well-made safety standards could 
reduce injuries and advance innovation by reducing uncertainties about requirements. For these 
reasons, the National Institution of Safety and Standards has a project to develop the safety 
standards and performance measures to enable humans and robots to work together in the same 
space; and establish performance measures for sensors used to monitor the work area and ensure 
the safety of robots, vehicles, and people.115 
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3.1.2 The European Union legislation and guidance on Artificial Intelligence  
One quite remarkable piece of legislation in the EU about AI and robotics is the European 
Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, which I have been 
talking already earlier. In the general principles of those rules, the European Parliament states, 
for example, part T: “whereas Asimov's Laws must be regarded as being directed at the 
designers, producers and operators of robots, including robots assigned with built-in autonomy 
and self-learning, since those laws cannot be converted into machine code”; and part Y: 
“whereas it is appropriate, in view of the stage reached in the development of robotics and AI, 
to start with civil liability issues”.  
In the next part about liability the European Parliament state, inter alia, part AA.: “ whereas a 
robot's autonomy can be defined as the ability to take decisions and implement them in the 
outside world, independently of external control or influence; whereas this autonomy is of a 
purely technological nature and its degree depends on how sophisticated a robot's interaction 
with its environment has been designed to be”; part AC.: “whereas, ultimately, the autonomy 
of robots raises the question of their nature in the light of the existing legal categories or whether 
a new category should be created, with its own specific features and implications”; and part 
AE. “whereas according to the current legal framework for product liability — where the 
producer of a product is liable for a malfunction- and rules governing liability for harmful 
actions -where the user of a product is liable for a behaviour that leads to harm- apply to 
damages caused by robots or AI”. 
Altogether there are ten different sections in the liability part, which in my mind reflects quite 
well that the EU is really taking the liability of AI seriously. Even just those couple referenced 
parts picture well that the EU is considering the problem with the liability of AI if the current 
legal framework is sufficient enough and who would be liable if AI makes a mistake. In the 
other parts of that liability section, the European Parliament mentions things like what to do 
when AI can make autonomous decisions, in what circumstances manufacturers and owners 
can be held strictly liable for acts or omissions of a robot and how the injured person can prove 
the actual damage. Later on in the Resolution, it discusses general principles concerning the 
development of robotics and AI for civil use, and here they discuss things like intellectual 
property rights, safety, different robots, liability and international aspects. The paragraphs 49-
59 of the Resolution are about liability. Though they are only just discussions/considerations, 
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they give a good picture of the way where the European Parliament seems to want the legislation 
about AI liability to go.  
Some of those Resolution paragraphs about liability have already been partly discussed in 
section 2 of this thesis. However, I will still cite Wagner here to make a summary of the most 
important or interesting paragraphs regarding liability. So in substance, the European 
Parliament suggests a choice between the "risk management" and "strict liability" approaches. 
According to the Parliament, a strict liability rule requires proof of only three disparate 
elements, which are damage, a harmful functioning of the robot, and a causal link between those 
two. However, it remains open whether "harmful functioning" of a robot is equivalent to its 
malfunctioning, i.e. requires a deviation from the behavioural design of its manufacturer.116  
In my opinion, equivalenting harmful functioning to malfunctioning could be good and bad. In 
case it is equivalent, then if out of sudden a robot lawnmower starts to cut legs instead of crass 
to which it was programmed to, there seems to be malfunction. However, the change in 
programming could also be, because the owner programmed it again. In these kinds of 
situations, it should be made clear to what extend the strict liability for manufacturer applies. 
What I mean is that the comparison should be made case-by-case to see if the harmful 
functioning was indeed because of malfunctioning or defect and not because of the malicious 
intent of the owner. 
The risk management approach, which would be an alternative to strict liability, would be 
focusing on the individual who was able to minimize risks and deal with negative impacts 
instead of concentrating to the person who acted negligently. However, according to Wagner, 
it seems that the risk management approach is in urgent need of a principle of attribution and 
further elaboration upon the principle that has been chosen. Besides of these two approaches, 
the Parliament also pictures, as a long-term perspective, the creation of a special legal status for 
robots, i.e. their recognition as ePersons, and these ePersons would be liable for any damage 
caused by the autonomous behaviour of the robot. At the end of the Resolution, the Parliament 
also mentions insurance issues and considers that there might be a need for mandatory liability 
insurance like there is now for cars. This compulsory insurance mechanism could be 
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supplemented by a fund that would pick up losses not covered by liability insurance, as is the 
case already in the area of motor traffic.117 
Of course, this resolution is no the only document from the EU regarding AI. On May 2018 the 
Commission published a report on the Application of the Council Directive on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products (85/374/EEC) (Fifth Report), which is basically 
about the evaluation of the Product Liability Directive. In the Fifth Report, the Commission 
states that “2018 is not 1985. The EU and its rules on product safety have evolved, as have the 
economy and technologies. Many products available today have characteristics that were 
considered science fiction in the 1980s.”  
By the statement mentioned above, the Commission seems to mean that the Product Liability 
Directive is a useful tool, but not quite up to date and it needs some update to correspond the 
technology now and in the future. This idea can be seen a bit further down, where they state 
that the Product Liability Directive is still an adequate tool. Still, there is a need for clarifying 
the legal understanding of certain concepts and some products, which may pose a challenge to 
the performance of the Directive, need to be looked closer. The Commission also states in the 
Fifth Report that their “goal is to ensure that: (i) the EU continues to have a product liability 
regime that fosters innovation; (ii) products placed on the EU market are safe; and (iii) people 
who suffer injury because of defective products can claim compensation when accidents occur.” 
Basically, all the EU’s AI-related stuff are still guidance’s, reports or equivalents, even though 
many of the publications are quite recent. For example, the Parliament has published a briefing 
about “EU guidelines on ethics in AI: Context and implementation” in September 2019. 
According to it, the core principle of the EU guidelines is that the EU must develop a “human-
centric” approach to AI that is respectful of European values and principles. The main idea of 
this approach to AI is to ensure that human values are central in AI development, deployment, 
using and monitoring, by providing respect for fundamental rights, including the rights in the 
Treaties of the European Union and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
These all are united by reference to a typical foundation rooted in respect for human dignity, in 
which the human being enjoys a unique and unchallengeable moral status. The guidelines also 
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discuss the essential EU requirements for achieving trustworthy AI, which are human agency 
and oversight; robustness and safety; privacy and data governance; transparency; diversity, 
non-discrimination and fairness; societal and environmental well-being; and accountability.118 
Furthermore, the guidelines consider the “need for coordination of actions at EU and national 
levels” as a few EU Member States (France, Germany, Finland119 and the United Kingdom) has 
started work on establishing their own national frameworks on ethics and AI in parallel to the 
EU initiatives.120 
The latest publications from the European Parliament are “White Paper on Artificial 
Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust” and “Report on the safety and 
liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things” both of which were 
published on February 2020. The main points, of which the White Paper consists of, are: (1) 
the policy framework setting out measures to align efforts at European, national and regional 
level and in partnership between the private and the public sector, the framework aims to 
mobilise resources to achieve an “ecosystem of excellence”; and (2) The key elements of a 
future regulatory framework for AI in Europe that will create a unique “ecosystem of trust” and 
to do so, it must ensure compliance with EU rules, including the regulations protecting 
fundamental rights and consumers’ rights, in particular for AI systems operated in the EU that 
pose a high risk.121 
The more interesting report of these two, at least regarding this thesis, is the second report about 
safety and liability implications. According to that report, the Commission has recognised the 
importance and potential of the new technologies, and it is committed to make Europe a world 
leader in AI, IoT and robotics, but to achieve this goal, a clear and predictable legal framework 
addressing the technological challenges is required.122 Furthermore, there seem to be two levels 
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in general product safety and liability at the union and national level. At Union level, product 
safety and product liability provisions are two complementary mechanisms to pursue the same 
policy goal of a single functioning market for goods. At the national level, non-harmonised civil 
liability frameworks complement these Union rules by ensuring compensation for damages 
from various causes and by addressing liable persons.123 
In the Report, the Commission has also provided thoughts on what its plan is regarding the 
Product Liability Directive. The Commission state that even though the definition of product in 
the Product Liability Directive’s is comprehensive, its scope could still be clarified more for 
two reasons. First, to reflect better the complexity of new technologies and second, to make 
sure that reimbursement is always available for harm caused by defective AI products. That 
would better aid economic actors to evaluate if they could be considered as producers according 
to the Product Liability Directive. The Commission is also looking out if and to what extent it 
may be needed to ease the consequences of complexity by alleviating/reversing the burden of 
proof required by national liability rules for damage caused by the operation of AI applications, 
through an appropriate EU initiative. What comes to Union legislation, the Product Liability 
Directive says that if a product that does not meet mandatory safety rules, it would be considered 
defective, whether the producer has a fault or not.124 
Also, the Commission mentions that in close coordination with corresponding changes in the 
Union safety framework, the notion of “putting into circulation” in the Product Liability 
Directive could be revisited to consider that products may change and be altered. This could 
also help to clarify who is liable for any changes that are made to the product. What comes to 
the operation of AI applications with a specific risk profile, the Commission is seeking views 
on whether and to what extent strict liability may be needed to achieve adequate compensation 
for possible victims. The Commission is also seeking views about if mandatory insurance may 
be required for activities under strict liability, following the example of the Motor Insurance 
Directive, to ensure compensation even if the liable person in not solvent and to help to reduce 
the costs of damage. Regarding the activity of other AI applications, the Commission is 
considering if the burden of proof on causation and fault needs to be altered. In this respect, the 
Report from the New Technologies formation of the Expert Group on Liability and New 
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Technologies has noted an issue on the situation when the potentially liable party has not logged 
the data relevant for estimating liability or does not want to share that data with the victim.125 
As can be seen from the above, the EU is really taking part in the discussion about AI liability 
and how to regulate it. It can also be seen that the EU is actively thinking about the problem of 
AI liability, and it has noted that the current regulation needs to be amended to answer the 
questions about AI. The “Report on the safety and liability implications of Artificial 
Intelligence, the Internet of Things and robotics” is an excellent example about how serious the 
Commission takes the issue and it is also an outstanding report regarding the actions needed for 
regulating the AI. From my personal view, I hope that those actions mentioned in that report 
will take place sooner than later. As already said multiple times, especially the idea of 
ePersonality would be really good, if it is implemented well. For my, maybe a bit partial, 
opinion, the guidance and discussion in the EU on AI liability is way better and more advanced 
than in the US, although the effective legislation on AI in overall is better in the US. However, 
this should not be a competition against anyone, but everyone should make co-operation, as the 
issues regarding AI can be and are global and therefore global legislation in this are is needed. 
 Managing the liability risk 
3.2.1 Supervising Artificial Intelligence  
Referring to the earlier chapter about owner’s liability and equating robots to animals, 
governing dangerous robots more by law like dangerous animals and particularly dangerous 
dogs would be a good idea. For example, the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 took on a two-way 
approach to deal with dangerous dogs. Firstly it introduced an offence of either owning or being 
in charge of any dog which was dangerously out of control within either a public place or a 
non-public place in which it was not permitted to be. Secondly, it introduced type-specific 
legislation by which particular types of fighting dog breeds were banned like told earlier in 
chapter 3.2.2.126 
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Maybe one of the oldest or maybe most known laws about robotics was given by science fiction 
author and biochemist Isaac Asimov. He wrote three laws of robotics, which a robot must 
follow before deciding. What this means is that these laws produce a reasoning process, which 
the robot must go through before it can make any decision. If the decision would break any of 
those laws, in the order first, second, and the third law, this process does not allow the robot to 
make that decision. These three laws are, in order: 
Law 1: A robot may not harm a human being, or allow, by inaction, a human being to come to 
harm. 
Law 2: A robot must obey orders given by a human being, unless these orders are in conflict with 
L1. 
Law 3: A robot must protect its own existence, unless doing so is in conflict with L1 or L2.127 
Even though they are just fiction and developed for science fiction literature, they could be a 
good starting point for legislation governing robots and maybe other AI. However, it is accepted 
among roboticists that general implementation of these laws is not practically viable. Still, 
Asimov’s laws have been used in limited extend as part of AI research into autonomous 
decision making.128 The Asimov’s laws were just an example of legislation, which could be 
applicable for robotics and more generally to AI. Of course, in maybe even not so distant future, 
if and when robots are considered equal to humans, and they walk among us, they would be 
under the same laws as humans are. But until then, there could and need to be legislation 
applicable to the current situation.  
So besides, or in addition to, the Asimov’s laws, there need to be laws to govern the AI-systems 
itself or the makers of AI-systems. Like university professor Amitai Etzioni and CEO of the 
Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence Oren Etzioni have stated, “Operational AI systems (for 
example, self-driving cars) need to obey both the land and our values”.129 Even though they did 
not mean any special legislation to deal with the issue, but a particular type of supervision, the 
legislation would be a good starting point. Maybe not straight to govern AI itself, but at least 
the humans behind the AI. Supervising AI in its essence is not even a unique idea, as in our 
society people are being almost constantly supervised by someone, like at work by the employer 
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or children by their parents. However, this is something that needs to be stated and work with, 
so it would not be forgotten and taken for granted. 
In addition to legislation, there could be some kind of supervision/oversight system watching 
over AI systems, as Etzioni & Etzioni have proposed. They argue that all societies have had 
oversight systems, like workers, have supervisors and teacher have principals. In these systems, 
first-line operators are under the oversight of the second line operators, and they must respond 
to corrective signals from the overseers.130 So, for example, workers need to do what their 
supervisors tell them to do. In the same way, then AI systems need to have some kind of 
oversight and, according to the same authors, this oversight should be provided at least partly 
by supervising AI systems.  
Firstly that is because operational AI systems are learning systems, so they keep collecting data. 
This continuous data mining and the experience are being used to improve their performance, 
which could lead them to lapse from the guidelines they were programmed to and no human 
can monitor these changes, especially in real-time to determine if those changes are within the 
law. Secondly, AI systems are also becoming too complicated for people to understand or 
different entities, like governments or corporates, want to keep the algorithms as a secret so that 
no one can understand them. Lastly, according to Etzioni & Etzioni, these AI guided systems 
increasing autonomy, meaning that they sometimes decide on their own, maybe even defying 
their original guidelines. One example of this is an emergency braking that stops the car without 
the human driver doing anything when it senses dangers, which sometimes can happen because 
of false alarm. Therefore for all of these three reasons, there is a need for AI supervisor or 
guardian.131 
Of course, supervisors also need supervisors. Simplified, generally in workplaces employees 
are responsible for their managers, who are responsible for the chief executive officer, who is 
responsible for the board of directors who then are responsible for the shareholders. So 
everyone answers to someone and everyone have their supervisor. In the same way, AI 
oversight needs to have a supervisor. Also, someone needs to decide which oversight system 
will supervise which operational system. Etzioni & Etzioni argue that different parties have 
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their own oversight systems, so they are also deciding what system oversights what operational 
one. For example, manufacturers of the driverless cars want to, of course, ensure that their 
products stay in line, so they have their own systems.  
On the other hand, courts and law enforcement authorities will have their own AI oversight 
system, for example, to determine who or what will be liable for accidents, and whether or not 
there was the intention. The last question remains then that who guards the guardians. The best 
answer is that humans should have the last word about the roles and actions of both the AI 
operational and AI oversight systems. Neither of those systems should be completely 
autonomous. Ultimately, however, smart a technology may become it is just a tool to serve 
human purposes. As already establishes earlier, those who make or use these technologies 
should be held responsible for their programming and utilization. Hence these same people 
should be the ultimate authority over the operation and oversight of AI.132 
3.2.2 Managing the risks with insurances 
One thing there still need to be looked out for is the insurance policy. As Van Dam has stated, 
liability insurance has made the rules of strict liability possible. The driver, the manufacturer, 
or the owner of the animal can continue his activities without having to worry that liability for 
damages will ruin his financial situation. The fact that the insurer generally pays compensation 
means that the group of insured carries the burden, and they can often re-distribute these costs 
to the customers. In this sense, large companies and insurers not only have ‘deep pockets’ but 
are also loss spreaders.133  
Therefore it is essential to look at this aspect concerning AI because innovation has often made 
existing insurance products to be insufficient. Also, frequently insurance companies have been 
in an awkward position of needing to elaborate on new solutions without having complete 
information134 or because if the robot causes harm, the victim’s compensation would be 
assured.135  In addition, also clear liability rules are essential for insurance companies, as they 
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help companies to calculate their risks and to claim reimbursement from the party ultimately 
liable for the damage136. I will first examine the insurance from the view of the insurance 
products and insured parties; in other words, the manufacturer and the owner of the AI product. 
Insurances are quite crucial in almost everything we do to protect us from risks, be it done by a 
car crash or leaking dishwasher.  
Insurances are also quite necessary to companies and manufactories, as insurances enable them 
to manage risks better, especially what comes to developing new technology. Therefore if this 
gap, offering decent insurances for robots and other AI products, is not filled, it may result in a 
technology-harmful effect by delaying the emergence of new robotic applications onto the 
market. In the end, that could hamper the formation of a robust robotic industry. The problem 
about managing the risk, therefore, has to be understood as more broadly encompassing ethical 
as well as social implications of cutting-edge technologies. 137 
In its essence, insurance is a contract, which purpose is to protect the insured party from the 
detrimental economic consequences of a possible risk. The risk can be of any type, depending 
on a negligent behaviour of the insured, or of third parties, causing harm to the same party 
entering the contract (first-party insurance) or to others (third party insurance). Insurance is one 
of the possible legal tools that parties can resort to manage the risks they face with their 
activities. Generally, insurances are not compulsory, so the parties are left free to decide 
whether to enter an insurance contract to manage their risk. However, in some cases, the risk 
associated with a particular activity is too high, or that hazardous moral behaviour and adverse 
selection may negatively affect the pooling and spreading of the damages that arise. Therefore 
in these activities, there is duress by law to have insurance (typically third party insurance).138 
One reason why having sufficient insurances with robots is essential is that inter alia Japans’ 
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry has found out that “current technique is insufficient 
in identifying and evaluating the risk of unexpected potential accidents that results from the 
expansion of the area to utilize robots”. For example, industrial robots can be divided into two 
groups: robots operating in isolation from human beings, usually constrained inside protective 
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cages; and “collaborative” robots, which are designed to interact physically with workers. As 
the first type is generally isolated from humans, there probably are fewer accidents with that 
kind of robots. However, as safety standards for the robots interacting with humans are still 
under development, it is hard yet to say if those collaborative robots will increase or further 
reduce the safety of the workers working with them. Another question is about the autonomous 
vehicles (AV), no matter how safe they will be, there will still be accidents with them, because 
of causes and malfunctions that probably cannot be foreseen.139 
As already discussed earlier, the question is that if an accident occurs, will it be the 
manufacturer’s fault, or the owner’s fault. However, the owner of the car would need to have 
some indivisible element of risk, as, for example, there could be damage or theft of the vehicle 
when it is parked in a driveway. What comes to medical robots, according to Bertolini and the 
others, the most recurrent issues concerning surgical robots and insurance are about the 
coverage of specific surgical interventions by the national health insurance service and the 
reduced health insurance costs resulting from robotic-assisted surgery. Also, most of the 
commercial robots currently in the market are not covered by any specific insurance product, 
like for instance is the case of surgical robots. According to Bertolini and others, existing 
medical insurances to some small operations may apply, but it is not sure whether the specificity 
of the robotic device is considered when determining the premium.140  
How can the risk then be calculated? Calculation of risk is essential for the insurances, as it is 
the basis of the premium. That calculation of risk is based on the definition of its frequency and 
severity. However, according to Bertolini and others, the difficulty in assessing risks associated 
with the robots “is due to (i) the technical complexity of robotic devices, (ii) the lack of 
sufficient data with respect to the potential risks and the accidents they may cause, (iii) the 
uncertainties with respect to liabilities that producers and users may face. [I]n some cases, it is 
not even clear which party may be held liable, hence, ultimately, who should have the interest 
to acquire insurance coverage.” Altogether, this could mean for the robots and AI that all robotic 
devices possibly would not be insured, the existing insurance contracts will be used even if they 
                                                 
139 Bertolini – Salvini – Pagliai – Morachioli – Acerbi – Trieste – Cavallo – Turchetti – Dario 2016, pp. 3-4. 
140 Bertolini – Salvini – Pagliai – Morachioli – Acerbi – Trieste – Cavallo – Turchetti – Dario 2016, p. 5. 
52 
 
would not be adequate, or the insurance premiums would be higher. That, in turn, could delay 
spreading of the robots and hamper the industry for the production of robots.141 
All those problems cannot be solved by just introducing new legal duties for users and 
producers to purchase first or third-party insurance products. The result in that practice could 
be that the problem could worsen and further delay the adoption and spreading of robotic 
devices. Insurances are one of the essential tools to enable technology transfer from research to 
the market and the creation of a new industry. In addition, the risk management function of 
insurances help transform uncertainty into an advance cost that may be internalized by the party, 
and in case of the producer, the cost could be distributed through price mechanisms among all 
possible users of the robotic device. In the end, any effort in the direction of technology and 
legal assessment would help to provide the necessary conditions for the development of specific 
insurance products for robotic devices and that would help the robotic industry and other 
technologically advanced industries. 142 
The other part why insurances are essential is the risk externalization and the compensation of 
the victim. One way to compensate the victim, according to Wagner, is that the robot could be 
required to have minimum assets to qualify as a legal entity in the same way as limited 
companies are usually required to have minimum assets. This kind of minimum asset 
requirement would oblige parties to provide the funds necessary to satisfy potential damages 
claims, and then the funds would be transferred under the robot’s possession. Then in case of 
accidents, the damage claims would be paid off from those funds. The other and maybe better 
way to ensure compensation for victims would be mandatory insurances. The burden for 
providing the compulsory liability insurance would again be on the natural and legal persons, 
so the owner and the manufacturer. They would just need to supply the insurance contract and 
pay the premiums.143  
The prime advantage of insurance over other forms of hedging risk is that there is no minimum 
amount of assets needed. Hence, the insurance buyer does not need to wait until he has enough 
assets and that there is no tied-up capital as savings for the victims, so the assets remain liquid. 
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In this point of view, the mandatory insurance could be a better solution for ePersons than 
having minimum asset requirement. The usual suspects for financing the insurance are already 
familiar: the manufacturers of the robots and their users. If the manufacturers have to front the 
costs of insurance, they will pass these costs on to the owners/users of the robot. In one form or 
another, the costs would end up to the users, so it does not make a difference if the users 
contribute directly to the asset cushion or become liable for the insurance premiums. In the end, 
the producers and users of robots will have to pay for the harm caused by the robots and the 
ePerson is only a conduit to channel the costs of cover to the manufacturers and users.144  
So both of those legal tools, the minimum asset requirements and mandatory insurance, are 
well-suited to avoid risk externalization as they assure the victim’s compensation at least to the 
minimum amount. Beyond this amount, the risk externalization would persist. However, if 
autonomous systems generate significant savings in accident costs that they are promised to, 
then no liability subsidies, like insurances, would be needed. Wagner also states that as a general 
matter, it is submitted that the issue of limited liability should be addressed and discussed head-
on rather than hidden in the issue of recognition of autonomous systems as ePersons. The 
liability of users, at least as long as it is fault-based, is typically unlimited.145 
As the legislation needs to be amended to cover AI, in the same way, insurances and their terms 
need to be amended to cover AI and different damages made by AI. Insurances are an important 
part of our society and therefore they should not be forgotten, nevertheless what is the people’s 
opinion on the insurance industry. Insurances are also very good at externalising the risk, and 
risk is an important part of liability. Therefore I see it essential to talk also about insurances 
when talking about AI liability. It does not matter who the liable party is if he does not have 
enough assets to pay the damages and compensation to the victim. Besides, paying 
compensation for something my AI product did should not drive me to personal bankruptcy. 
The ideas I presented here especially from Bertolini and others regarding insurances are quite 
good in my opinion and should be considered by the insurance companies and maybe even by 
legislators.  
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4 INTERNATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LIABILITY AND THE 
STATES RESPONSIBILITY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 International legislation on transboundary liability and Artificial Intelligence 
4.1.1 States responsibility and sovereignty and territorial sovereignty 
What comes to liability in international law, there are two essential doctrines relating to it, and 
they need a closer inspection before I can go further to the liability and AI liability. The first 
doctrine is a state responsibility. As it usually is with typical social relations, when one person 
violater another person’s legal interests, it creates responsibility determined by some particular 
legal system and international relations act in the same way.146 According to Ian Brownlie, one 
of the international law’s general principle is the responsibility, and the law of responsibility is 
concerned with especially the payment of compensation for loss caused. Furthermore, the 
character of state responsibility does not base on delict same way as in domestic law, but 
“international responsibility” relates both to breaches of the treaty and other violations of a legal 
duty. As Judge Huber has said, according to Brownlie: “All rights of an international character 
involve international responsibility.”147 
In principle, an act or omission, which results in a breach of a legal obligation, rises liability in 
international law, whether the requirement arises by treaty, custom, or otherwise. However, 
many rules order the conduct required without being very clear about the degree of necessary 
advertence from the state organs involved, and this is a common fault even in torts of English 
law. Also, the problems in intergovernmental relations can usually be compared to those arising 
from the activities of employees and companies in English law and sometimes it is more the 
relationship than fault which is held to justify liability. Therefore objective tests are usually 
used to determine responsibility in international law. However, it is possible that governments, 
as groups of morally responsible natural persons, are capable to prove intention or negligence. 
Technically, objective responsibility is based on the voluntary act -doctrine: when the agency 
and casual connection are established, it makes a breach of duty. Furthermore, according to 
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Brownlie, it is believed that the practice of states and the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals and 
the International Court follow the theory of objective responsibility.148  
The classical approach to state responsibility can be found in the decision in the case Trail 
Smelter Arbitration (the United States v. Canada). According to The Oxford handbook of 
international environmental law, in that case, the tribunal relied on “the principle of general 
international law” prohibiting a “State …to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner 
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein 
when the case is of serious consequences and the injury is established by clear and convincing 
evidence”. The same primary assumption can be found from grounds of the International Court 
of Justice decision in the Corfu Channel case. In this case, the court referred to “every State's 
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used to cause harm to the citizens or 
property of other States.”149 Also, the court stated that “it cannot be concluded that just because 
of the control exercised by a State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, 
or should have ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it 
necessarily or should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from other 
circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof.”150 
Moreover, besides being a theory and rules from courts decisions, the International Law 
Commission (ILC) has codified the universal system for state responsibility in the Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Responsibility Articles) in 
2001. The law of state responsibility is based on two different sets of rules: “primary rules”, 
which establish the obligations of states, and “secondary rules”, which are concerned with the 
breach of primary standards and the consequences of breaching those rules. Furthermore, 
according to The Oxford handbook of international environmental law, the term “state 
responsibility” is often being used to point out to secondary rules, following the decision of the 
ILC to limit its articles on state responsibility to those rules.151  
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The ILC Responsibility Articles are divided into three different parts. In part 1 of the articles, 
there is the fundamental basis for triggering state responsibility, the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by a state. For example, by the ILC Responsibility Articles Article 
1 “Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that 
State” and by Article 2 “There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct 
consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and 
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”  Then part 2 of the ILC 
Responsibility Articles is about the “content of the international responsibility of a State”, 
which is the issue of remedies, like Article 31 about reparation. Finally, part 3 gives grounds 
for the “implementation of the international responsibility of a state”. This part is about the 
invocation of the responsibility of a state and countermeasures.152 
Timo Koivurova also adds that the general rules of state responsibility codify customary 
international law in many respects as many rules reflect the existing universal international law. 
However, those rules give just rough guidelines as to which standards are applicable if a state 
breaks international law. According to Koivurova, the rules operate like the customary law that 
applies to all treaties. That means that they apply if states have not agreed otherwise with each 
other. The ILC Responsibility Articles do not describe the requirements, “primary rules”, from 
states in each case in detail. Instead, they focus on “secondary rules”, which are the 
consequences of a state’s violation of one or more of the primary rules, so a state does not do 
what is expected of it. The ILC point of view here is that although the fundamental rules differ 
in different fields of international law, for example, the standard of care that is expected of a 
state if a primary rule is violated, the same secondary rules apply.153 
States sovereignty and territorial sovereignty are also essential doctrines here. First of all, even 
though it may sound obvious, states are sovereign in their land areas, and almost all land areas 
belong to states, except Antarctica, where sovereignty claims are frozen, but not renounced. 
Ownership of a territory, which means that the state is sovereign in a region, also contains 
sovereign rights to specific adjoining maritime spaces and airspace. Koivurova states that a 
state is sovereign up to the outer edge of its territorial waters, which is 12 nautical miles and 
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that is similarly the outer edge of a state’s airspace.154 Brownlie adds that the concept of territory 
also includes islands, islets, rocks and reefs as well as the seabed and subsoil of the territorial 
sea.155   
According to Koivurova, territorial sovereignty, in reality, is often just an illusion. Nowadays 
the world’s airspace is open to many airlines because of the intergovernmental treaties and 
foreign ships have been legally guaranteed “innocent passage” on the territorial sea.  
Furthermore, multinational companies operate across many countries and in a fully global 
market in terms of goods and services. Of course, sovereignty also brings some responsibilities. 
One of these responsibilities is that a state must prevent and minimize the probability of 
environmental harm from any operations it permits in its jurisdiction and control. In addition, 
as a coastal state can allow oil drilling in its continental shelf, even as far as 400 kilometres 
from the coast, it is also liable to organise an appropriate environmental impact assessment 
before deciding to grant the permission.156 
Then there is the state sovereignty, which characterises the fundamental constitutional doctrine 
of the law of nations that governs a community comprising primarily of states having a uniform 
legal personality. The primary outcomes regarding the sovereignty and equality of the states 
are jurisdiction over a territory and the citizens living there; non-interference in the area of other 
states jurisdiction; and the dependence of obligations arising from customary law and treaties 
on the consent of the obligor. State sovereignty can also be seen as a discretionary power within 
the state territory (as defined earlier). Therefore only states can, among other things, delimit the 
territorial sea or deicide for the self-defence, though only within limits allowed by law.157  
The essential part of the state sovereignty, which is vital regarding the liability, is the 
jurisdiction and jurisdictional competence. As part of the independence, jurisdiction refers to 
judicial, legislative and administrative power of the state. According to Brownley, the starting 
point of this law is that the jurisdiction is territorial. However, this approach a bit outdated, and 
the law is currently being developed by two different principles. First is the territorial theory, 
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which is the best foundation to the law, but does not provide answers for modern jurisdictional 
conflicts. By the second principle, the substantial and genuine connection between the subject-
matter of jurisdiction, and the territorial base and reasonable interests of the jurisdiction sought 
to be exercised, should be observed. For the meaning of these principles, we can look them 
from the criminal jurisdiction of the state. However, they are applicable for civil liability too, 
as the problems created by civil and criminal jurisdiction over aliens do not have a significant 
difference between them.158 
The big discussion regarding the jurisdiction is that in which municipal court can exercise 
authority in respect of criminal acts under the forum. The principle, which has received 
universal recognition, is the territorial theory, but it is just a single application of the essential 
territoriality of sovereignty. By this principle, the courts of the state where the crime is 
committed can exercise jurisdiction. This principle’s advantages are the convenience of the 
forum and presumed interests of the state where the crime is committed. This principle has also 
sometimes been given an extensive application. One example of this principle is often applied 
“objective territorial principle”, by which the jurisdiction is founded when any crucial 
constituent element of a crime is consummated on state territory.159  
The objective principle got also support from the Permanent Court of International Justice in 
the case Lotus, where the basis of the majority view on the Court was the principle of objective 
territorial jurisdiction.160 Another quite important and generally recognized policy is the 
nationality principle as a basis for jurisdiction over extra-territorial acts. The use of nationality 
principle can also be extended by reliance on the residence and other connections as evidence 
of allegiance owed by alien and also by ignoring changes of nationality. However, many states 
place limitations on the nationality principle, for example, because of possible double jeopardy 
caused by dual nationalities.161 
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4.1.2 General liability regulation in international law and conventions 
According to Koivurova, legal liability in the international community is primarily defined 
based on the compensation principles of general international law, and legal liability can be 
applied easiest on factual circumstances. One example is strict liability in fundamentally 
hazardous functions, like managing nuclear power plant. It does not matter how carefully a 
nuclear power plant is maintained, as there is always a risk of catastrophic harm. States have 
negotiated strict-liability agreements to cover operations such as these; the originator of any 
damage is generally liable irrespective of how carefully the plant is operated.162 Therefore, the 
strict liability provisions in international law and national law seems not to differ so much from 
each other. 
However, in international law, strict liability on essentially hazardous activities is regulated by 
exclusive agreements, strict liability agreements. Usually, these agreements are related, for 
example, to nuclear power plants, although strict liability agreements have been developed only 
in recent years, like the conventions established by the OECD and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in the early 1960s. Koivurova says that both of those nuclear treaty systems 
have the same basic principles: 
“1 The liability is channelled to the operator of a nuclear power plant: the treaty systems apply 
the principle of ‘polluter pays’.  
2 The liability is strict (so there is no need to prove that an operator is at fault), but if the damage 
is due to force majeure (such as war or natural catastrophe), there is no liability to compensate. 
3 The liability is limited; it was considered that otherwise nuclear plant operators would find it 
impossible to obtain insurance because of the inherent risk of disaster (the operator, however, 
must take out insurance up to the limit of the risk).  
4 In both treaty systems, states, and ultimately their taxpayers, bear the liability if the limit is 
exceeded.”163 
Furthermore, regarding strict liability, one historically significant aspect to it is the regulation 
of civil liability for maritime oil transportation. The oil transport agreements are based on the 
principle that the owner of the ship has strict liability, except if the owner can prove that the 
damage was not caused by the ship. So, in this case, the burden of proof deviates from the 
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normal state and is thus reversed. However, like with nuclear plant damage, the owner’s liability 
is limited. Koivurova says that the reason in this was that unless the liability was limited, only 
a few states would have ratified the Convention.  
However, that also means that often the victims are not adequately compensated. As the owner 
probably in most cases do not have enough assets to pay the possible damages, the ship’s owner 
must insure the vessel to secure compensation. If the insurance would not be sufficient, the 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage takes effect. The Fund’s purpose is to 
supplement the oil liability Convention by collecting contributions both from oil companies, 
who operate within the convention parties and from the recipients of oil into a fund from which 
compensation can be paid. In these cases, states have prioritized the liability of individual actors 
and industries for compensating environmental damage. Just in one agreement states have 
assumed the primary liability for compensation and that is the Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.164 
State responsibility rules are an essential starting point for international liability. This is well 
reflected on the critic the ILC got from its first draft of “International liability for injurious 
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law”. Apparently, ILC’s 
approach on the first draft resulted in the separation of the liability topic from that of state 
responsibility. This approach was seen to be “fundamentally misconceived”. The critics' key 
complaint was that in the law of state responsibility, the relevant activity being unlawful is not 
the issue but whether the home state fulfils its due diligence duty in avoiding to cause 
transboundary harm.165 
After the criticism of several drafts, the ILC decided to further divide the liability topic into two 
parts, the prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities and liability for injurious 
consequences. The liability part is focused on the legal regime for the allocation of loss from 
transboundary harm arising out of dangerous events. However, it has been reoriented to focus 
more on civil liability, instead of state liability. The first part about prevention adopted the 
primary obligation of states concerning harm prevention from the draft convention, which 
outlines fundamental rules of conduct aimed at preventing or minimizing the risk of significant 
                                                 
164 Koivurova 2014, p. 179. 
165 Bodansky – Brunnée – Hey (eds) 2008, p. 1022. 
61 
 
transboundary harm (Articles 1 and 3). That means that the essential ground underlying the 
draft convention is the need for management of risk and cooperation and consultation between 
states. In the articles, the harm is defined to mean losses to persons, property, and the 
environment. There is a commentary about the draft convention, which explains that the risk of 
causing significant harm refers to a combined effect of the possibility of occurrence of an 
accident and the scale of how injurious it is. The draft convention also confirms a few essential 
procedural duties between states, which have to contribute to the avoidance of significant 
transboundary harm: cooperation (Article 4); notification and information (Article 8); 
consultation on preventive measures (Article 9); and exchange of information (Article 12).166 
Then there is also the question about the standard of care or diligence. Koivurova explains that 
it really cannot be said precisely when a state has done what is required in terms of diligence 
when figuring out if the state’s measures, for example, in examining the possibility of 
transboundary impacts in advance are enough. The required standard of care gets higher as the 
probability of severe transboundary consequences or the more severe the potential damage gets 
higher. For example, in the cases where the environmental damage is caused to the environment 
beyond the state, the principle of no-harm in customary law requires similar diligence. 
However, usually, the real problem in these cases is that states are not prepared to act for the 
benefit of the international community as a whole when environmental damage harms them all. 
For this reason, states are willing to exercise their legal rights only in the situations when there 
is recognisable damage to their own territory and even then, only rarely.167 
One necessary liability protocol is the Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage 
Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel 
Liability Protocol)168, which is still not in force, even though it had been drafted already in 
1999. Basel Liability Protocol’s objective is stated under its Article 1, by which its purpose “is 
to provide a comprehensive regime for liability and adequate and prompt compensation for 
damage resulting from the transboundary movement and disposal of hazardous wastes.” 
Interesting article in the Basel Liability Protocol is its Article 6. It enforces a duty to notify 
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other interested states of the proposed transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, as the 
process of exporting hazardous wastes is very complicated, so there could be many liable 
parties. The protocol, however, identifies the actual exporter as the responsible party, who is 
held strictly liable. Although under Article 12 and Annex B, the strictly liable party is liable 
only up to a specific limit, unlike party liable by fault liability169, whose liability does not have 
any financial limit.170 
Furthermore, other relevant or interesting articles in the Basel Liability Protocol are, among 
other things, Article 2, which defines the damage. Under the Article 2, the damage is defined 
as loss of life or personal injury; loss of or damage to property; loss of income directly deriving 
from an economic interest in the use of the impaired environment; and costs of specific 
measures taken to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage or to effect environmental clean-up. 
Quite closely related article to article 2 is Article 15 (1) about the financial mechanism, which 
states that in situations “[w]here compensation under the Protocol does not cover the costs of 
damage, additional and supplementary measures aimed at ensuring adequate and prompt 
compensation may be taken using existing mechanisms.” According to the Oxford handbook 
of international environmental law, it is understood that such a mechanism is provided by the 
Technical Co-operation Trust Fund, established under the Basel Convention and supplied by 
voluntary contributions.171  
After all these liability protocols and ways to hold someone liable, it is also good to know and 
remember that there can also be limits to the strict liability in international law. One of such 
limitation is in the Convention on damage caused by foreign aircraft to third partes on the 
surface, signed at Rome, on 7 October 1952 (Rome Convention). According to Pagollo, this 
convention provides for a limited compensation scheme for incidents as well as limits to such 
strict liability regime, by reversing the burden of proof.172 According to Article 6.1 of the Rome 
Convention: 
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“Any person who would otherwise be liable under the provisions of this Convention shall not be 
liable for damage if he proves that the damage was caused solely through the negligence or other 
wrongful act or omission of the person who suffers the damage or of the latter’s servants or agents. 
If the person liable proves that the damage was contributed to by the negligence or other wrongful 
act or omission of the person who suffers the damage, or of his servants or agents, the 
compensation shall be reduced to the extent to which such negligence or wrongful act or omission 
contributed to the damage.” 
This means that like under specific national regulations if the liable person can prove that the 
victim caused the damages, then the liable person be released from the liability, instead of being 
strictly liable for everything. It is terrific to have that kind of clauses, as it would not be fair if 
the victim causes all the damages, but someone would need to pay the costs just because of the 
strict liability. Sometimes even internationally victim just has to suffer from his or her own 
actions or omissions. 
4.1.3 International legislation on Artificial Intelligence 
International organisations have also considered the problem with AI liability. For example, in 
2016 OECD has mentioned the liability issues in “OECD Science, Technology and Innovation 
Outlook 2016”. In that report, OECD stated that AI could make errors that result in potentially 
serious damage (e.g. wrong patient diagnosis) and AI choices may also be subject to 
misinterpretation, criticism or refusal (e.g. loan refusal). They continue that the nature of AI is 
imperfect; it raises questions about the principles of legal responsibility and how liability should 
be shared among AI itself, programmers, owners and other possible parties. Laws and legal 
frameworks will be needed to be devised and implemented before many of the benefits of AI 
can be gained in markets like transportation and health.173  
OECD has on its part been active regarding AI, as OECD has taken part in AI discussion also 
with “The OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence”, which, at least according to the OECD 
webpage, “promote AI that is innovative and trustworthy and that respects human rights and 
democratic values”. OECD member states adopted the principles in May 2019, when they 
approved the OECD Council Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence (Recommendation). 
These principles set standards for AI that are practical and flexible enough to stand the test of 
time, even in such a fast-evolving technological field as AI. They complement existing OECD 
standards inter alia in privacy, digital security risk management and responsible business 
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conduct areas. The Recommendation also offers five suggestions for governments: facilitate 
public and private investment in research & development to spur innovation in trustworthy AI; 
foster accessible AI ecosystems with digital infrastructure and technologies and mechanisms to 
share data and knowledge; ensure a policy environment that will open the way to deployment 
of trustworthy AI systems; empower people with the skills for AI and support workers for a fair 
transition and; co-operate across borders and sectors to progress on responsible stewardship of 
trustworthy AI174 
The Recommendation consists of only two sections. The first section is called “Principles for 
responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI” which is divided into five different principles. It is 
also underlined that those five principles are only complementary and should be considered as 
a whole. These five principles are 1.1 Inclusive growth, sustainable development and well-
being; 1.2 Human-centred values and fairness; 1.3. Transparency and explainability; 1.4 
Robustness, security and safety; and 1.5 Accountability. From these principles, the most 
interesting ones for this thesis are the principles 1.4. and 1.5. The principle of robustness, 
security and safety go as follows: 
“a) AI systems should be robust, secure and safe throughout their entire lifecycle so that, in 
conditions of normal use, foreseeable use or misuse, or other adverse conditions, they function 
appropriately and do not pose unreasonable safety risk. 
b) To this end, AI actors should ensure traceability, including in relation to datasets, processes 
and decisions made during the AI system lifecycle, to enable analysis of the AI system’s outcomes 
and responses to inquiry, appropriate to the context and consistent with the state of art. 
c) AI actors should, based on their roles, the context, and their ability to act, apply a systematic 
risk management approach to each phase of the AI system lifecycle on a continuous basis to 
address risks related to AI systems, including privacy, digital security, safety and bias.” 
The principle 1.5 about accountability states that “AI actors should be accountable for the 
proper functioning of AI systems and the respect of the above principles, based on their roles, 
the context, and consistent with the state of art.”175 
The second section is about national policies and international co-operation for trustworthy AI, 
which also consists of five different principles concerning research, digital ecosystem, policy 
                                                 
174 OECD / What are the OECD Principles. It should also be noted that the OECD Recommendations are not 
legally binding, but they are still highly influential. They have set the international standard in a wide range of 
areas and helped governments design national legislation, like the OECD Privacy Guidelines have done. 
175 OECD 2019. 
65 
 
environment, labour market and last international co-operation. The first four principles are 
about national policies and the last one, as can be concluded from its name, is about 
international principles. Under the principle 2.5 International co-operation for trustworthy AI 
“a) Governments, including developing countries and with stakeholders, should actively co-
operate to advance these principles and to progress on responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI. 
b) Governments should work together in the OECD and other global and regional fora to foster 
the sharing of AI knowledge, as appropriate. They should encourage international, cross-sectoral 
and open multi-stakeholder initiatives to garner long-term expertise on AI. 
c) Governments should promote the development of multi-stakeholder, consensus-driven global 
technical standards for interoperable and trustworthy AI. 
d) Governments should also encourage the development, and their own use, of internationally 
comparable metrics to measure AI research, development and deployment, and gather the 
evidence base to assess progress in the implementation of these principles.”176 
What then these principles have on the AI liability? The principle 1.4 sounds quite much what 
is expected from the manufacturer about the product. The product, in this case, AI application, 
needs to be safe for regular use or foreseeable use/misuse and it should not have unreasonably 
safety risk, which is almost exactly what I talked about on chapter 2.2.1 on manufacturer’s 
liability. The principle also talks about risk management, which likewise is already at minimum 
discussed in national legislation. This principle is then supplemented by principle 1.5 about 
accountability, which quite clearly states that if the application does not function as it should, 
then the AI actor, like the manufacturer or by the context also the owner, has accountability 
over it. In the second section, there is not so much about liability, but it has something to give 
for the international legislation and agreements on AI. The principle 2.5 basically encourages 
different states to act together and with OECD to create common technical standards for AI and 
to advance these principles, which I understand to mean all principles in the Recommendation, 
so AI policies, safe use of AI and risk management.  
In addition to all this, the UN’s specialized agency for information and communication 
technologies, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) leads the organisation of the 
annual “AI for Good Global Summit”, aimed at building a common understanding of the 
capabilities of emerging AI technologies, with the help of other UN organisations. In the 
summit of 2019, ITU and its 37 UN partners updated the 2019 version of the Compendium “UN 
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Activities on Artificial Intelligence”, which outlines the uses of AI. It also offers insights into 
the challenges associated with AI by addressing ethical and human right implications and 
invites all the parties regarding AI to consider how best to work together to ensure AI serves as 
a positive force for humanity.177 The uses of AI by UN organisations are for example, by The 
Food and Agriculture Organization to detect fall army worm damage using a mobile 
application,178 by UN Environment Programme to monitor water-related ecosystems with the 
help from Google Earth Engine and the European Commission’s (Commission) Joint Research 
Center179 and by UN World Tourism Organization to select top startups that use AI as a way to 
predict and analyze tourist behaviour.180 
One interesting activity on AI in the UN Activities on Artificial Intelligence is the AV project 
of the UN Economic Commission For Europe. Their Sustainable Transport Division provides 
the secretariat services to the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29), 
the World Forum that integrates into its regulatory framework the technological innovations of 
vehicles to make them safer and more environmentally comprehensive. WP.29 has been 
working since 2014 on technical regulations for automated and autonomous vehicles, and it has 
found that there are some prominent AI applications, like the vehicle self-driving capability, for 
the automotive sector. WP.29, which is the regulatory body managing the three Multilateral 
Frameworks related to the construction of vehicles, their subsystems and parts as well as the 
periodic technical inspection of road vehicles, is monitoring the technological developments 
regarding AV’s. However, unlike in some national legislative framework, WP.29 did not take 
any action framing the use of AI in vehicles. That was because WP.29 thinks that any regulatory 
measure would be premature at this point, and they would just limit the innovation and 
technological development for the AV’s. Still, the WP.29 adopted the Framework Document 
for Automated Vehicles drafted by the China, EU, Japan and the US. The Framework 
Document contains the Safety Vision for automated Driving as well as Key Safety Aspects 
relevant to these products.181 
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 Analysing national and international Artificial Intelligence liability  
4.2.1 International liability laws regulating Artificial Intelligence liability 
As one could see from the previous section, there are already discussion, guidance, agreements 
and regulation regarding liability and, in some extend, also AI, but as is the case with many 
states national law, there is not much legislation and agreements regarding AI liability. In this 
section, I am going to go through some legislation and agreements regarding already existing 
international legislation and agreements, for example, on electronic communications, and see 
how they could be amended to cover also AI. 
In the current legislation, there are some great conventions and other regulation, which could 
be extended for AI, by taking into account also “normal” liability rules and international 
doctrines. There is, for example, a UN convention called “United Nations Convention on the 
Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts”, which Article 12 is a general 
principle for AI liability. Article 12 states that a person, who can be a natural person or a legal 
entity, on whose behalf a computer was programmed should ultimately be liable for any 
message generated by the machine.182 So even though that convention is not about AI liability 
per se, there are some excellent principles for it. 
As a whole, Article 12 goes as follows:   
“A contract formed by the interaction of an automated message system and a natural person, or 
by the interaction of automated message systems, shall not be denied validity or enforceability on 
the sole ground that no natural person reviewed or intervened in each of the individual actions 
carried out by the automated message systems or the resulting contract.” 
The meaning of the article is opened up in the Electronic Communications Convention 
Explanatory note section 213, according to which: 
“Article 12 is an enabling provision and should not be misinterpreted as allowing for an automated 
message system or a computer to be made the subject of rights and obligations. Electronic 
communications that are generated automatically by message systems or computers without direct 
human intervention should be regarded as ‘originating’ from the legal entity on behalf of which 
the message system or computer is operated. Questions relevant to agency that might arise in that 
context are to be settled under rules outside the Convention.”183 
                                                 
182 Čerka – Grigienė – Sirbikytė 2015, p. 378. 
183 Čerka – Grigienė – Sirbikytė 2015, p. 383. 
68 
 
As can be seen from this note, electronic systems cannot be held liable, meaning that computers 
are not seen as legal persons by international law, and so only natural and legal persons can be 
held responsible or at least they should ultimately be the responsible party. This is because of 
the general rule that the user of the tool is responsible, as the tool does not have its own will.184 
This matter is not usually a problem in situations where the owner has acted intentionally or 
otherwise very carelessly or if the AI product would have had a defect on it in manufacturing. 
The problem might be, however, in events where the AI itself has caused harm, particularly 
when talking about fully autonomous robots.  
Ugo Pagallo explains that the Unicitral document enclosed in the proposal of the UN 
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts states that 
“general principles of agency law (for example, principles involving limitation of liability as a 
result of the faulty behaviour of the agent) could not be used in connection with the operation 
of such systems. The Working Group reiterated its earlier understanding that, as a general 
principle, the person (whether a natural person or a legal entity) on whose behalf a computer 
was programmed should ultimately be responsible for any message generated by the machine… 
As a general rule, the employer of a tool is responsible for the results obtained by the use of 
that tool since the tool has no independent volition of its own.”185 
Hence, according to the proposal, it could be reasoned that a robot, as a machine, should be 
seen as a tool. Therefore, the user or the manufacturer would be the responsible party when a 
robot makes a mistake. This idea goes partly with the approach discussed in the earlier section 
that robots could be compared to animals, and the owner should ultimately be responsible. 
Nevertheless, Pagollo lists three reasons why the “robots-as-tools” approach may not be okay 
after all. The first reason is that very likely humans would delegate complicated cognitive tasks 
like acquiring knowledge for decision-making to smart robots. Secondly, it does not necessarily 
mean that when the principal delegates task to a robot that the legal effects of the behaviour of 
the robot should inevitably fall upon the principal. Although, the robot’s counterparty C should 
be allowed to expect, in good faith, that the machine really means what it declares, when 
negotiating with the robot, so that principal cannot evade liability by claiming he did not intend 
to conclude such a contract. The third reason is that the robots-as-tools approach seems 
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unsatisfactory when responsibility and risk must be distributed between, for example, operators 
and users as principals of the robot. Operators and users of robots should be held responsible 
for the different errors of the machine and the circumstances of the case.186 
The approach in the proposal of the UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications 
in International Contracts is almost the same as in the US Computer Information Act, which 
really is not so surprising. Even though it cannot be said for sure, it looks like the UN 
Conventions copied the US Act here. It should not matter who are the parties of the contract or 
who act on behalf of the parties, the contract should still be binding. Therefore also contracts 
made by the robot-agent should be valid. In my opinion, Pagallo’s reasons against keeping robot 
as a tool make sense, as especially self-learning AI robots cannot really be considered just as a 
tool, but something more. Still, even agreements made by a human agent are binding, so it 
should not be different here. 
What comes to state responsibility in this matter, also states should be responsible for the 
decisions AI has made for them. As was stated in the Trail Smelter case, a state should not 
allow to use or permit the use of its territory in a way which causes injury to property or persons. 
This same should apply when damages were caused because of the robot acting behalf of a 
state, notwithstanding if the robot is kept as a tool or not. This issue should also go under Article 
2 of the ILC Responsible Articles. From this article, it can be seen that if the act or omission is 
attributable to the state under international law, it is an internationally wrongful act (and it 
breached an international obligation of the State.  
I see this in a way that if an internationally wrongful act is done on behalf of the State, the State 
should be responsible and it does not matter who does it, as long as it is attributable to the state 
under international law. The states would get out from charges too easily if the act of the robot 
would not be binding to the state, so in the worst-case scenario, states would blame everything 
to the robot and save themselves from liability. For this reason, in my opinion, the UN 
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts should be 
amended to cover also robots and other AI products and also make it apply, even though robots 
would not be seen as tools.  
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However, the liable party is protected from the liability under Article 6.1 of the Roman 
Convention, if he can prove that damage was caused solely through the negligence or other 
wrongful act or omission of the person who suffers the damage or of the latter’s agents or if the 
liable person can prove that the damage was contributed to by the negligence or other wrongful 
act of the person who suffers the damage, or of his agents, the compensation shall be reduced 
to the extent to which such negligence or wrongful act or omission contributed to the damage. 
This same clause could and should apply also when a robot is involved, either as an agent of 
the liable party or the party who suffered damages. Furthermore, in the event we decide to stick 
to a strict liability model of vicarious responsibility in the case of robot-traders, Article 11 of 
the earlier mentioned Rome Convention suggests how we should interpret the idea that human’s 
strict liability can be limited to the value of a robot’s peculium, according to Pagallo. The Rome 
Convention states that the amount of financial compensation to be paid is determined based on 
the weight of the aircraft causing the damage. In the case of robots, the amount of the peculium 
could be established based on the “work contract activities” of the machine, so as to distinguish 
between, inter alia, the duties of a robot nanny and those of a robot waiter.187  
Lastly a couple of things about international agreements. Just as previous international 
agreements have regulated technological advancements over the past decades for example, in 
fields such as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, a similar UN-sponsored agreement is 
urgently needed to define the conditions of legitimacy for the employment of robot soldiers.188 
And robot soldiers are not the only robots, which would need to be regulated by international 
agreements, but also other types of robots should be regulated via international agreements in 
the same way as other technological advancements, as Pagallo mentioned. Another good 
example of an agreement about technology is the United Nations Convention on the Use of 
Electronic Communications in International Contracts, which was discussed at the start of this 
section. Ai products could be regulated in the same way with an agreement or that UN 
convention could be amended to include all kinds of AI products.  
As the biggest issue in the AI regulation now is that it nearly does not even exist and for 
example, the conventions, agreements and article do not quite cover the AI products, the 
solution here would be to make new agreements and articles or amened existing ones. The 
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examples presented here are good ways to regulate, but if some agreement applies only to 
normal aeroplanes, it does not matter how good and applicable it is, but if it delimits or does 
not cover AI at all, then those articles are not usable. Some problems are also coming from the 
fact that always the owner or developer just cannot be made responsible, especially if the robot 
is a self-learning smart robot and even a reasonable owner would not have been able to know 
or prevent the acts of the robot. For these occasions, granting an ePersonality to robots should 
also be recognised in international law and this subject I am going to consider next.  
4.2.2 What national legislation can give for international legislation on AI 
As stated above, I am going to present some of my thoughts on what parts of the national 
legislation guidance and regulation could also be implemented to international law for better 
international control on AI. My main idea here is that I am going to go through a couple of 
issues, which I have already established and found possible solutions to them from the 
measures, which I have studied earlier. In the same way as the UN Convention on the Use of 
Electronic Communications in International Contracts is almost the same as in Electronic 
signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C., some other regulation and ideas 
could be implemented from national laws to international law to supplement the regulation of 
AI liability in international law. 
First is the owner’s and manufacturer’s liability in an international perspective, especially when 
the damage caused by AI is transboundary. The problem could arise here regarding state 
responsibility and jurisdiction, as discussed earlier. One possible solution to this from national, 
or more precise union level, is giving ePersonality to robots, which also should be recognised 
by international law. As mentioned earlier, providing ePersonality to robots could make robots 
liable for themselves, so protecting the manufacturer (and possibly the owner) in case of self-
learning and a fully autonomous robot would cause damages. Giving ePersonality could also 
mean that robots need to be also given rights, like voting rights and even citizenship.  
Citizenship, however, could be useful from the international law perspective. If the robot would 
get citizenship of some state, then the responsibility, as well as jurisdiction, for the damages 
what that robot causes, would belong to that state. With a robot having citizenship, all the 
incidents could be handled in the same way as the tortfeasor would be a human. Then it would 
not even matter if the owner and the manufacturer would both have different citizenships, as 
only the robot’s nationality would count. 
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Under Article 2 of the ILC Responsibility Articles: 
“There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or 
omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the State.” 
If the liable party cannot be found, it could be hard to find the action or omission attributable 
to a particular state. And the responsible party cannot be found if there is no clarity of the liable 
party, especially if all the potentially liable parties (so basically the owner and the manufacturer 
of the AI) are from different states. Giving robots ePersonality and citizenship will also help 
with this issue, as then the liable party is evident as well as the nationality, thus giving 
establishing the responsible state. 
Of course, this problem could be solved in some other way too, but for example, making the 
owner responsible party, it would need first that the national legislations implement that. I do 
not see that very plausible approach, that under international treaties the owner would be liable 
and thus the owner state or the state where the owner has residence would be liable for another 
state, but in national law, it would not be so. Therefore it may be most natural in international 
regulation to follow the same principles as the majority of states have. Either way, the law here 
should be harmonized, so the treatment of AI would be universal as the new technology is also 
universal, and it could be in many places at the same time. 
International law could also imitate national law by implementing the same kind of regulation 
as there is now or is being prepared in the US and the EU. One excellent example would be the 
Civil Law Rules on Robotics from the European Parliament. Even though it is more just a 
discussion and consideration than actual regulation, there are many good parts, which could be 
implemented in international law, for example, by an international agreement. As learned 
already, there is also a discussion about granting robots an ePersonality, which makes that 
resolution even better for international law to implement. Things like when the producer of 
a product is liable for a malfunction, rules governing liability for harmful actions and when the 
user of a product is liable for a behaviour that leads to harm are things that could also be given 
some thoughts in international conventions.  
All in all, there are plenty of good legislations or at least thoughts about how to regulate AI in 
national and EU legislation, so in my opinion, it would not be pointless to see if they could be 
implemented to international law. Things like state jurisdiction and responsibility could be 
solved by granting robots ePersonality and citizenship and then the state, which citizenship they 
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have, would have responsibility and jurisdiction, at least in most of the cases. Of course, there 
will always be cases, where the liable party is hard to find, but if with some measures we could 
solve most of the cases, in my view that measure should at least be thought about. Everything 
cannot be solved with just agreements between a few states and, for example, ePersonality that 
kind of thing, which should be given more consideration in international law, and national laws. 
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5 CASE-LAW ANALYSIS AND OTHER LIABILITY EXAMPLES 
 Nilsson v. General Motors LLC 
5.1.1 Case summary 
The second AI-case concerns self-driving car and it is the first known lawsuit against a 
manufacturer, according to the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform189. In January 2018 a 
lawsuit was filed against a manufacturer over an accident involving an AV. In this lawsuit, a 
motorcyclist claimed that he suffered neck and shoulder injuries after a 2016 Chevrolet Bolt 
knocked him to the ground while travelling on a San Francisco street. General Motors (GM) 
and its Cruise subsidiary have had a permit to test AV’s on California roads since June 2015. 
According to the quite short complaint by the motorcyclist, a driver was in the front seat, but 
he was “driving” the car in self-driving mode with his hands off the steering wheel. The operator 
instructed the Chevy Bolt to move from the middle line to the left lane. The complaint claims 
that the motorcyclist, who was travelling directly behind the self-driving car, attempted to move 
ahead and pass the car because it changed lane to the left. As he did pass the vehicle, the plaintiff 
claims that the Chevy Bolt abruptly swerved back into its original lane, striking him and 
knocking him to the ground.190  
Nevertheless, there is more than one side to this story, as is often the case in car accidents. In a 
report GM filed with California’s Department of Motor Vehicles, the automaker explained that 
the Chevy Bolt was driving in the middle lane until the car saw space and attempted to turn into 
the left lane. Because the minivan ahead of the Chevy Bolt in the middle lane slowed down, the 
Bolt deserted its attempt to merge into the left lane. At the same as the Chevy Bolt was coming 
back in the middle lane, the plaintiff was approaching the car, “lane-splitting” between the 
middle and right lanes in slow, heavy traffic. The GM’s report also said that as the motorcycle 
moved into the middle lane, it “glanced the side of the Cruise AV, wobbled, and fell over”. In 
addition, the San Francisco Police Department police report proves that the motorcyclist was at 
fault when he attempted to overtake and pass another vehicle on the right before it was safe to 
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190 Nilsson v. General Motors LLC 1/2018, pp. 2-3 and Silverman – Wilson – Goggans 2018, pp. 57-58. 
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do so. Though, the motorcyclist’s attorney says that the police report also supports the 
motorcyclist’s version of the events.191 
Maybe the most interesting part here is that the lawsuit names only GM as a defendant and it 
does not claim that the Chevy Bolt’s operator would have contributed to the accident. However, 
the only claim is negligence, making the lawsuit more or less like a traditional auto accident 
claim than a product liability claim that would allege that a vehicle was defectively designed.192 
According to the complaint, GM owed the motorcyclist a duty of care to, “hav[e] its Self-
Driving Vehicle operate in a manner in which it obeys the traffic laws and regulations,” and 
GM “breached that duty in that its Self-Driving Vehicle drove in such a negligent manner that 
it veered into an adjacent lane of traffic without regard for a passing motorist, striking Mr 
Nilsson and knocking him to the ground.”193  
In addition, according to the Torts of the Future, if the case would have proceeded to trial, the 
plaintiff could have argued that the Chevy Bolt failed to perform as a reasonable person would 
in similar circumstances. Basically, the lawsuit treats the AV much like a person, rather than as 
a product. Authors of the Torts of the Future also state that the lawsuit suggests, in addition to 
suing for damages, that as cars become even more autonomous, attorneys may continue to bring 
traditional negligence claims to courts instead of needing to have complicated product liability 
lawsuits that likely necessitate expert testimony on auto design and autonomous technology. 
However, it seems to be inevitable that car manufacturers, who include AI and autonomous 
technology into their vehicles, are more likely than before to be named as defendants in cases 
involving motor vehicle accident.194 Unfortunately (for regulation-wise) this case did not go to 
trial, but the parties settled the dispute between them. However, according to their “joint 
stipulation for dismissal with prejudice”, GM “does not admit any liability as to the claims and 
causes of action asserted against Defendant”.195 
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5.1.2 Case analysis 
So what does this case have to offer in terms of the AI liability? Well firstly, if this would have 
been a typical car accident, so driver colliding with the other driver, there would not have been 
any questing about the liable party. The driver controls the car and makes the decisions about 
speed or when to turn. Therefore, if in this case, there would not have been AI controlling the 
vehicle, the driver would have undoubtedly been the defendant. The story here does not tell 
why the motorcyclist chose GM as a plaintiff and not the driver or the AI-software developer. 
In the Uber’s death case196, mentioned earlier in chapter 2.2.2, the company did not have all the 
blame, as some responsibility was also distributed to the safety driver in the car, who did not 
monitor the driving environment and the operation of the vehicle, but she was more focused on 
her phone. The situations in Uber’s and GM’s cases are bit different though since the GM case 
was pure civil law case as car accidents usually are. In contrast, the Uber case involved death 
and thus a potential criminal liability, although it must be mentioned that at least the prosecutor 
did not charge Uber with a crime as there was no basis for it197. 
Secondly, here the case was not at least directly about a manufacturer’s liability for defect 
product, but it was about the manufacturer’s duty of care to have its product obey rules and 
drive negligent. It would have been nice to hear the court’s opinion on that that if the 
manufacturer of AV has a duty of care towards other drivers or people altogether. In this case, 
the AV made its decision because of the car in front of it did something unexpected, and not 
because it would have had some sort of defect, like a short circuit. Here we come back to the 
same question already mentioned when talking about manufacture’s liability that as products 
become more autonomous, traditional product liability law may fall to negligence principles. 
That then might focus on whether the product’s action was reasonably foreseeable and could 
have been avoided through exercising due care.198 So basically, if the motorcyclist could not 
have foreseen that the AV would change back to its original lane because the car in front of it 
was slowing down and the AV’s decision to turn back could not have been avoided through 
exercising due care, then with this reasoning, the manufacturer could have been held liable. 
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Nevertheless, this case shows that with the AV’s, manufacturers need to be careful, because 
unlike with accidents involving regular vehicles, with AV’s included they can be held liable or 
at least they can be sued. 
Could any risk management policy, that is supervision and insurances, have helped in this case?  
At least insurances would not have prevented this, as it is not their task. As I do not know all 
the facts, it is hard to say what were the insurance terms in either party. However, I highly doubt 
that the conditions in any insurance during the accident would have covered the damage made 
by AV. In case the GM would have had insurance, which covers costs made by AV, there 
probably would not have been the need even to sue anyone. That is usually the case in car 
accidents that parties are not rushing to the court unless there is something unique to the case. 
Hence I would argue that sufficient insurance could have saved the parties for the trip to the 
court in the first place. What comes to the supervising AI, it probably would not have helped 
here either, as everything happened so quickly, and the supervisor cannot take control of the 
car and for example, do not let it change lane in the first place. However, if the GM would have 
some kind of supervisor system, then with the help of that they could analyse what happened 
and with that knowledge, try to prevent something like this happening again. 
 Examples of liability issues caused by real-life robots 
5.2.1 Liability caused by a service robot 
A robot, which carries out useful tasks for humans or equipment, however not industrial 
automation application, is called a service robot. One example of a service robot for household 
use is a robotic vacuum cleaner.199 So how does the liability divide between different parties 
when the robot causing damage is a harmless service robot, for example, small vacuum cleaner? 
So primarily vacuum cleaners are quite safe products, so this robot is not considered as 
dangerous. This semi-autonomous cleaner goes around the house on its own and seeks dust and 
dirt from the floor while avoiding chairs, walls and other obstacles. The owner does not need 
to, move it, push it or anything. Just command it to clean with mobile app or equivalent, and it 
does the job. Now the owner, Mark, has his grandmother Susan, who has difficulties in moving 
and fragile bones, visiting him. Mark has commanded his vacuum cleaner robot to clean in the 
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same room his grandmother is while he is indifferent room. The robot is on his business, but 
manage to run into Susan, who falls breaking her leg and thus rising liability claim to someone. 
To start looking for the liable source, first what need to do is to see if the robot was defective. 
As mentioned earlier, the product manufacturer has strict liability in case of a defect in the 
product which has occurred during the production or if the product does not have an adequate 
warning label in it. In this case, the manufacturer/developer could be liable because of the defect 
so if the robot had some malfunction because of defect the robot vacuum cleaner had when 
purchased it or because there is some unique manufacture defect only in his vacuum cleaner. 
Another possibility to get manufacturer liable is that if the product did not have adequate 
warning label warning, for example, “do not let the robotic vacuum cleaner without supervision 
or otherwise it may cause harm”. If one of these is the case, then Susan could hold the 
manufacturer liable, if she can provide these facts, causation and damages. She could also sue 
Mark, who could then hold the manufacturer liable and demand reimbursement from them. 
In a situation where there is no defect or inadequate warning label in the robotic vacuum cleaner, 
then the owner could be held liable. We can presume it is an ordinary robotic vacuum cleaner 
without any dangerous add-ons, so the strict liability in hazardous robots does not need to be 
considered. However, if there is no defect to make the manufacturer liable, the owner could be 
liable for negligence, for example, for negligent supervision. So that Susan could sue Mark for 
negligent as an owner of the robot, she must prove that Mark owed her a duty of care as she 
was a victim within the foreseeable zone of danger, that by his negligent supervision his conduct 
fell below the standard of care one of a reasonably prudent person, that such behaviour is the 
reason what caused her injuries, because the accident was foreseeable, and that she suffered 
damages.200 
The last scenario is that everyone is liable to Susan’s accident, so the cost of damages goes to 
everyone. If Susan was negligent herself and caused the accident because of that or at least 
contributed to the accident because of her own negligence, Mark could raise that as a defence. 
Mark could have warned Susan of the vacuum cleaner and that she needs to watch her step. If 
curiosity got to Susan and she went to look closer to the robot, and because of that she stepped 
on it, of course then she cannot hold Mark fully responsible for the accident. If this would be 
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the case, then liability, as well as the costs regarding the accident, would be divided between 
all parties involved, so manufacturer, owner and victim. 
5.2.2 Liability caused by a security robot 
Another example involves more dangerous and potentially lethal, security robot. Here the 
accident could be that Mark has a security robot on his piece of land guarding the property. 
Lauren then is jogging past Mark’s property, and for some reason, the security bot chases 
Lauren and gives her electricity shock ending up hurting Lauren. Here the manufacturer’s 
liability works the same way as with the robotic vacuum cleaner, so if there is a defect or the 
warning label is not sufficient enough, or there even is not any, then the manufacturer could be 
held strictly liable. If there is no defect in the robot, in its software or its sensors and there is no 
insufficient warning label in the robot, manufacturer’s and developers’ liability are ruled out 
quite effectively. In this case, the owner’s responsibility is a bit different and more interesting. 
A person has a strict liability in situations like this when there is a highly significant risk of 
harm even though the defendant has taken all proper precautions if the damage is foreseeable 
and characteristic to the risk presented by the activity and resulting from it. It is easy to argue 
that owning a security robot is a situation where a highly significant risk of harm is present. 
Also because strict liability rules apply with movable objects, like motor vehicles and dangerous 
animals, for their higher risk to cause severe damage, this gives the owner of the security robot 
strict liability for any damage caused by the robot.  
Even if Mark has done everything as one could expect from a reasonably prudent person, with 
just owning a dangerous robot, he can be held strictly liable for the damage done by the robot. 
With using the comparison of dangerous robots to dangerous dogs, just the type of the robot, 
security robot, could be that kind of “breed” of a robot that it can be held dangerous. That means 
that any harm done by the robot will make the owner strictly liable, so in this case, Mark would 
be liable for the damage done to Lauren, even if he would not have done anything wrong and 
as with dangerous dogs under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, his security robot could be set to 
be destroyed if it would constitute danger to public danger, for example, because of malfunction 
in its system. With a dangerous robot, Mark could have joint liability with the manufacturer in 
case of failure or another defect in the robot, as they both would have strict liability. Even if not 
equating dangerous robots to dangerous dogs, owner of the perilous robot could still be held 
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strictly liable as owning a movable object, as it has a high chance for accidents that could cause 
severe damage. 
Lastly, as with the vacuum cleaner, the accident could be entirely or partly the victim’s fault. 
Here the case could be that Lauren was trespassing on Mark’s property, where were proper 
signs warning about security robot in the property. So, Mark could argue that Lauren assumed 
the risk when she did not care about warning signs and came to his property without permission. 
So for example, under Germany strict liability rules there is a defence for external cause, under 
which acts of the claimant may be invoked if they were entirely beyond the defendant's control. 
201 However even if Mark could use that defence, he cannot escape liability entirely, and he 
could still end up liable for part of damages, as with the robotic vacuum cleaner although in this 
case, when equating dangerous robots to dangerous dogs, the court would not necessarily rule 
that the robot must be destroyed. And like with the vacuum cleaner, if the security robot here 
would have some defect, the manufacturer would also be liable, and hence with the victims’ 
action, every party would be liable. 
 
5.2.3 Can chatbot cause liability to its owners? 
Lastly, I go quickly through liability issues arising from different kind of robot or more just 
computer software, chatbot. Chatbots or virtual assistants are getting more and more popular, 
and even Finnish Tax Administration has its chatbot.202 However, when this chatbot makes a 
mistake or does not behave appropriately, who is liable? For example, if Tax Administration’s 
chatbot gives incorrect information which party has the liability? Here we can assume that in 
case of a defect in the software, that is the chatbot malfunctions and starts giving wrong 
information, the developer has the liability as explained earlier. And if there are no malfunctions 
and no defect in the software, then the liability falls to the owner, the Tax Administration.  
                                                 
201 Van Dam 2015, p. 301. 
202 https://www.vero.fi/en/About-us/it_developer/e-service-development/#chatbot. It is said there that their chatbot 
helps taxpayers in situations where help is needed quickly, and it can find essential information about the 
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It just could be that the bot was taught wrong; the owner did not supervise the bot enough, or 
other negligent behaviour. And while information giving computer software cannot be held as 
a dangerous robot, so to give the owner strict liability by owning deadly robot, it could be worth 
to give strict liability also to owners of AI application providing essential information which 
has a massive effect to the person receiving that information. Although in this specific case 
involving state authority which has public liability, so chatbot and the information it gives is an 
act subject to public liability by which the owner, Tax Administration, has liability if nothing 
else rises liability before that.203 
Another example, based on actual events, is the Microsoft’s former chatbot called Tay, who 
was an artificially intelligent chatbot with the personality of a 19-year-old and which the 
company hoped that people would interact with on different social platforms like Twitter and 
Kik. Microsoft’s idea was that by chatting with Tay, people would help her learn while having 
some fun and aiding her creators in their AI research. However, what started as a friendly and 
fun experiment, ended in 24 hours as twitter users taught it to say awful and racist things.204 So 
in less than 24 hours, Tay went from human loving bot to full Nazi, because people did not 
teach it the way Microsoft thought or wanted to, but instead, they tweeted all kind of misogynist 
and racist stuff which ultimately led to the point where Tay itself turned to be misogynist 
racist.205 
This happened already in 2016, and no claims were raised against anyone, but this whole thing 
still raises the question about who would be liable. If media were believed, the liable party here 
would be the Twitter users who taught Tay all that stuff, because many headlines in media were 
about how Twitter users taught Tay to be a racist.206 So the question here is that should the 
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liable party be Microsoft as the developer and owner of Tay or the Twitter users who taught 
Tay to be racist and run down some celebrities.  
When following the rules mentioned above, they would need to look if there is defect or 
malfunction in the chatbot to hold developer strictly liable, although as the developer and 
owner, in this case, are the same entity. Therefore it does not matter so much whether the 
liability falls to the developer or the owner. Seemingly there probably were not any visible 
defects. However, it could be argued if the self-learning feature, which allowed Tay to learn all 
the racist and other vulgar stuff without restricting it, was a defect or not. As chatbot cannot be 
held as a dangerous for life and health, the strict liability of the owner is not a suitable way to 
keep the owner liable. What then comes to the Twitter users, they probably cannot be held liable 
now, but maybe in the future when self-learning AI comes more common, there should be some 
legislation to cover also maliciously teaching AI. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 Final conclusions 
One thing is for sure: like already seen in the introduction, AI is a really international thing, and 
it has spread rapidly all over the globe in the past few years. It also used almost everywhere, by 
individuals or state. As already mentioned earlier, there are lots of different AI products already 
in use, like self-driving cars, robot vacuum cleaners and personal assistants in smartphones. 
Also, for example, the Slovenian Ministry of Finance uses a machine-learning system to detect 
tax evasion and tax fraud, Belgium police are using a predictive algorithm to predict car 
robberies. In Poland, AI is used to profile unemployed people and decide on the type of 
assistance appropriate for them.207 As also international organisations like the UN and OECD 
are talking about AI, it is a huge thing. Having said that, it should be remembered that with 
great power comes great responsibility. 
Because AI has spread so wide and it is used everywhere, the question is not “if damages 
happen”, but “when damages happen”. For this reason, the liable party should be clear, be it car 
crash with AV, robot vacuum cleaner autonomously tripping someone, autonomous weapon 
system launching by itself or anything else. It is also vital information to know how to manage 
risks regarding AI and understand the importance of the insurance system. The answer to the 
question “How someone can be liable” is essential information also for insurance companies, 
when they are drafting new insurance policies regarding AI. Furthermore, international 
organisations are already writing and thinking about different measures for AI, be it guidelines, 
different actions from organisations or even thinking of amending old legislation to correspond 
better for today, like the EU is doing with the Product Liability Directive. 
The first thing I noticed regarding AI was that there is not only one definition for it, as the 
OECD has its definition,208 but also the Encyclopaedia Britannica209and the EU210 have their 
definitions. In addition to these are many more definitions around the world. Even though the 
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definitions do not fundamentally vary from each other, I would argue that having just one 
universal definition for AI would make everything easier, also regarding AI liability. However, 
I realize that this is easier said than done. Many different meanings may become a problem 
regarding insurances. The potential problem here is that if different insurance companies use 
different definitions in their policies, then it is hard to know which company policy covers 
accident with the specific AI. Also, it could be hard to understand, if the insurance covers the 
accident as you are not sure if the AI application hit the definition the insurance company uses. 
Even though AI applications like a self-driving car or robotic vacuum cleaner would have 
universal definitions, in my opinion, there should be a universal definition for the concept 
“Artificial Intelligence” too, even if to just avoid errors. 
In main section 2, I discussed the individual liability by national law and provided answers to 
the questions “Who is liable when AI makes a mistake?” and “On what basis that party can be 
held liable?” and I found couple possible parties and many possible reasons. Although I must 
say here that when looking for the liable parties, there are not too many parties to look for, even 
though the amount of possible responsible parties in a car crash is a bit higher than in typical 
car crash, it is not too much. The harder question here is choosing the liable party and giving 
grounds to why that party is liable. I examined as liable parties the manufacturer (and 
developer), the owner and the robot itself. What I found here is that there is not any 
unambiguous answer. At this moment, the owner, the manufacturer, or they both can be liable, 
depending on the circumstances. In the (maybe even not so distant) future also the robot itself 
could be responsible alone or with the owner or manufacturer. 
The manufacturer’s liability depends, or a couple of different things. Firstly, the manufacturer 
could be held strictly liable if the robot has a defect or it does not have an adequate warning 
label. 211 Often the manufacturer’s liability is strict, so the manufacturer can be liable even if he 
did nothing wrong. With bundled devices, so for example devices where there are different 
devices bundled as one like a self-driving car, the possible liable parties are many, and it could 
be hard to say who is liable for the defect. As mentioned earlier, in this case, the contributory 
negligence could kick in.212 In its essence, contributory negligence is the plaintiff's failure to 
exercise reasonable care for their safety. Contributory negligence can be used often in cases, 
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where the victim has done or did not do something, which contributed to the emergence of the 
injury. In this case, it means that for example, the manufacturer, who put the car and its parts 
together, should have been more careful and scrutinize the parts for any defect. 
It can also be seen from the case law that people could hold manufacturers of the self-driving 
cars liable rather than the owner of the car, as happened in the case Nilsson v. General Motors 
LLC, where the victim sued General Motors, the manufacturer of the vehicle and not the owner. 
This was because, according to the complaint, GM owed the motorcyclist a duty of care to, 
“hav[e] its Self-Driving Vehicle operate in a manner in which it obeys the traffic laws and 
regulations,” and GM “breached that duty in that its Self-Driving Vehicle drove in such a 
negligent manner that it veered into an adjacent lane of traffic without regard for a passing 
motorist, striking Mr Nilsson and knocking him to the ground.”213 Even though this case was 
finally settled and we did not get any preliminary ruling from the court, it could be argued that 
if the majority of the people would think like the motorcyclist and when we add the strict 
liability of the manufacturer to the case, then at least in car accidents involving a self-driving 
car the liable party could generally be the manufacturer of the vehicle. 
Owner’s liability on robots was mainly compared to the owner’s liability to the animal, 
employer’s liability on the employees and liability in a situation where the robot acts as an 
agent. In my opinion, these all are plausible and good ways to hold the owner liable for the 
damages made by the robot. The comparison made by Schaerer, Kelley and Nicolescu that 
semi-autonomous machines are more equivalent to animals, which act on their own, than to 
everyday products, which are not as autonomous and do not act by themselves,214 is quite 
suitable in my opinion. As an example, I own and use a regular vacuum cleaner and a robotic 
vacuum cleaner and both causes damages. With the regular vacuum cleaner, unless it explodes 
because of the manufacturing defect, I am of course liable for the damages as I was the one 
using it and causing damages. When no one uses the vacuum cleaner, it does not cause any 
damages, as it cannot function alone. 
On the other hand, the robotic vacuum cleaner can work and move by itself, even when I am 
not around. As I am not using the robotic vacuum cleaner, it would not make any sense to have 
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me liable, as I was not even there. However, it would be quite harmful to the victim, if he would 
not get any compensation for the damages he suffered, as there would not be any liable party to 
pay damages. Without more regulation or guidance, the victim probably would not get any 
compensation. Who could say that I am liable when other person trips to my vacuum cleaner, 
which is lying on the living room floor? 
Analogously robots can be compared to animals and maybe also a bit to children. Both of them 
are capable of causing harm, but neither one of them are held liable, but instead, their owner or 
parents are held responsible and sometimes, especially regarding dangerous animals, strictly 
liable. I find this analogy good and quite good starting point when trying to figure out the liable 
party, at least as long as robots are not ePersons and cannot be held liable for themselves. 
Furthermore, the liability in an agency relationship complements the owner’s liability on its 
half. If someone lets the robot act behalf of him, as was in the WHOIS -case, the other party 
should trust that the contract made with the robot is valid, unless there were some specific 
reasons to think otherwise. So this in this way it makes sense to hold the principal liable for the 
actions of the robot agent in the same way as a human agent.  
When coming back to strict liability, there is also possible to ease it, as seen in Ugo Pagallo’s 
example. Same rules also apply for dangerous products now, but they might not be enough for 
fast advancing technology. So to quote Pagallo, “[w]ould such responsibility vary according to 
the different typology of robots with which we are confronted?”215 This is one of the reasons 
why the problem in finding the liable party is real and new rules regarding AI is needed. 
The final part of the individual liability is the robot’s being liable for themselves in the same 
way as people are liable for their own actions. Having an ePersonality for the robots would be 
quite a big thing, and it would “save” the owner and manufacturer from the liability in many 
situations. The interesting part here, in my opinion, is that this is not just consideration of legal 
scholars, but the European Parliament has thought it. If someday this could be true, I think it 
would be a massive step for legislation. This would also mean that the manufacturers and 
owners could have less fear of being subject to liability.  
However, at least in case of the manufacturer’s liability, it would not take it away completely, 
as manufacturers still need to take responsibility for the defects. Besides at least at first, robots 
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cannot pay any damages by themselves, so either the manufacturer or the owner would be 
responsible for them. I also agree with Wagner that the mandatory insurances would be the best 
way to “fund” the robots in case of accidents. I also agree with him that it does not matter if the 
insurance is paid by the manufacturers or the owners/users because in the end the owner/user 
will end up as a payer in one way or another. That being said, I think for the future giving 
ePersonality to robots will be an excellent thing, at least in point of view of the law. 
International liability, on the other hand, is a bit different thing even though the fundamental 
rules are the same there too. The general liability on international law is mainly based on various 
treaties and for the compensation principle. For example, for strict liability in hazardous 
activities is found in many cases on special agreements between states. For those agreements 
to cover harms caused by the AI, then the accidents caused by AI should be included in those 
agreements in the same way national legislation needs to include car accidents caused by AI. 
Furthermore, as by the state responsibility doctrine state is responsible for the damaged caused 
by that state or some individual in that state.  
However, what would be the case in the situation when the company stated in state A 
manufactures a robot or software for the company in state B and that robot or software then 
causes damages in the state C. Which state then has to bear the responsibility? It could be both 
A and B, but is it fair to make state A responsible here because the user of the robot should be 
accountable or should the manufacturer be strictly liable as in national law, even though there 
would not be any special agreement for this? For AI liability, maybe international law could 
look at some principles from the national laws or inter alia EU legislation and apply these 
principles to international law.  
The other possible problem there could be is robots ePersonality. As “normal” humans have 
nationalities as a fundamental right, should robots have citizenship too and if they have a 
nationality, is the state, whose nationality robots have, responsible for the damages the robots 
have inflected? I would argue that at least in the future if robots are considered equal to humans, 
and they would even have voting rights, as suggested by the BBC,216 then they should be 
regarded as humans in this case too and if using the nationality perspective from the state 
jurisdiction doctrine. Therefore the state whose nationality the robot has would also have the 
                                                 
216 BBC / Robots could demand legal rights. 
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jurisdiction over it. The problem still could be that if AI launches a missile to another country 
without any human influence, who has the responsibility and who has the jurisdiction. This is 
a question where I do not have an answer, and it is something, that should and need to be 
inspected more closely as in the future, there is a possibility for that.  
As a summary, it could be said that there is no simple or just one answer to the question for 
who is liable. If there would need to have a straight answer to who is liable, it could be 
something like: “The liable party depends on the circumstances of the event and the concerned 
AI application.” Therefore the better question could be. “For what reason the party X is liable 
in this specific case?”. As it is often with the new technology, the technology evolves faster 
than the law. The same problem is in this case, and even if it could seem to be evident that some 
specific party is liable, in reality, that party probably is not liable by law. It could be that the 
law is behind and does not recognise the liable situation or even the technology or it could be 
that party which at first seems to be liable cannot be held liable.  
This is the case, for example, with the self-driving car. We are used to that if someone crashes 
into my car, I hold the driver liable for the damages. However, with the self-driving car, it 
probably is not so, especially if the driver could not even do anything to prevent the crash. Here 
then I would demand damages from someone else, most likely from the manufacturer. So the 
question about AI liability is not so straightforward as it first could see, because either the liable 
party is someone else than you think or the law just does not recognise the situation yet. 
Therefore it is essential to think about these questions and amend the law in a way that it 
recognises these situations and the victims get compensation in all the possible cases, be it 
national or international damage. 
 Further research 
As thesis needs to be relatively short and the subject thus needs to be quite limited, I did not 
have time or space to study all the interesting and relevant topics that I think would need to be 
reviewed more. For this reason, I wanted to name a couple of these topics that I would have 
wanted to study. First, what I would have wanted to examine is the AI’s criminal liability. I 
focused only on civil liability, and I knowingly ignored criminal liability, but it is an essential 
part of liability too. I think the study regarding the criminal liability could and should be about 
that can a robot have criminal responsibility and, for example, can the owner of the robot go to 
prison because of the crime made by the AI, as usually people cannot be sent to prison on behalf 
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of someone else. In addition, as punishments have the deterrent and preventive effect, as their 
purpose is also to prevent crimes for happening because people do not want to have to pay fines, 
go to prison or get entry into the criminal record. How would then the deterrent and preventive 
effect work in the situation where the AI would have the criminal responsibility, as AI probably 
does not care if it gets into prison or like some software cannot even be put I the penitentiary? 
Furthermore, it probably is not so fair to put the owner of the AI to prison for the crime 
committed by AI, if the owner did not have anything at all to do with the crime. 
Another question related to the criminal liability is the state’s liability and jurisdiction in the 
international crimes, for example, if the AI launches a missile to another state or even to the 
same state by itself and even killing civilians. So in further research, I would like to study the 
state’s responsibility and jurisdiction from this point of view, even though I already studied 
state jurisdiction in criminal liability previously a bit. The issue what I would want to find out 
regarding the state’s criminal responsibility could the state face criminal responsibility if the AI 
launched missile all by itself without anyone affecting it. In addition, I would study what 
difference it would make regarding the liability and jurisdiction, if the AI, which launched the 
missile, would be made in another state. Would the manufacturing state then have 
responsibility? 
I would also like to examine more about different US and EU cases in AI liability as well as the 
liability insurance system. I did not have enough space to study and analyse more cases, and I 
would like to see how the court's decisions have evolved in last ten or twenty years in the field 
of AI and especially AI liability. More research could also be in examining what kind of cases 
there have been in courts and what decisions there have been given in the US and EU. So, for 
example, how often the owner or manufacturer has been the defendant and how often the court 
has agreed that the defendant is liable or then found out that the defendant is not liable after all. 
It would be interesting also to see are the decisions similar in EU and the US or do they vary a 
lot between these two different jurisdictions.  
Lastly, about the insurance system, I feel that there is a need to examine more at least that to 
what extent they would need to make cover harm made by AI. There is a need to balance 
between how much the insurance companies want the insurances to cover and on the other 
hand, how much the insurances need to cover. As a simple example, insurances will not be 
made to include every possible event, but it would be enough if they only cover malfunctions. 
Also, the terms need to be clear enough that people understand them. Still, the contents of the 
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insurance terms should specify accurately enough the AI applications, which would also mean 
that AI and AI applications would need to have unified definitions, so people can know for sure 
if the insurance covers the specific use or not. 
